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The Federal Government in the 
Fringe Economy 
Jim Hawkins* 
When most Americans need to borrow money, they turn to 
their local bank or credit union.  For a substantial minority, 
around thirty million people, however, banks and credit unions 
never enter the picture.1  Instead, people who are unbanked or 
underbanked turn to payday lenders, pawnshops, rent-to-own 
stores, or auto-title lenders for loans.2  These businesses, 
commonly referred to as fringe banking companies, offer short-
term loans to people who have been excluded from mainstream 
financial services because of poor or nonexistent credit histories 
or sporadic incomes.3 
The term “fringe banking” almost conveys the erroneous 
notion that these lenders are a trivial part of the economy.  In 
fact, quite the opposite is true; payday lenders and check cashers 
outnumber McDonald’s restaurants and Wal-Mart stores in the 
United States.4  Some estimates indicate that one in every ten 
Americans borrows money from a pawnshop every year.5  For 
many Americans, alternative financial services providers 
represent their only access to financial services.6 
Despite the important role fringe creditors play in the lives 
of millions of Americans, the federal agencies that regulate 
consumer credit have paid little attention to these lenders.  
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center.  I am grateful to 
the Chapman Law Review for hosting such a superb, timely symposium, to Ronald Mann 
for comments, and to Eamon Briggs, Jason Gay, and Blaine Larson for excellent research 
assistance. 
 1 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF 
UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 10 (2009) [hereinafter FDIC SURVEY] 
(reporting that 7.7 percent of American households, or nine million people, are unbanked, 
and 17.9 percent of households, or twenty-one million people, are underbanked). 
 2 See Ronald H. Silverman, Toward Curing Predatory Lending, 122 BANKING L.J. 
483, 486 (2005). 
 3 Id. 
 4 HOWARD KARGER, SHORTCHANGED: LIFE AND DEBT IN THE FRINGE ECONOMY 6 
(2005). 
 5 Jarret C. Oeltjen, Florida Pawnbroking: An Industry in Transition, 23 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 995, 998 (1996). 
 6 FDIC SURVEY, supra note 1, at 10. 
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Indeed, almost no federal laws are aimed directly at fringe 
banking.7  Although many states have implemented measures to 
protect consumers, the federal government has largely sat on the 
sidelines—until now. 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act represents a massive overhaul of the federal 
government approach to financial markets generally, and a 
momentous sea change in the relationship between the federal 
government and fringe banking.  One part of this legislation 
created the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (Bureau).  
Unlike the federal agencies before it, the Bureau presents a 
remarkable opportunity for the federal government to intervene 
in the fringe economy.  For the first time ever, the federal 
government has empowered an agency to monitor and supervise 
fringe creditors, to study fringe credit markets, and to 
promulgate rules relating to fringe banking transactions. 
This Article aims to describe and assess the effects the 
Bureau will have on fringe credit markets.  I make two central 
claims.  First, I argue that the Consumer Financial Protection 
Act (Act) gives broad, novel powers to the Bureau to regulate 
fringe credit.  Part I describes the scope of the Bureau’s power 
under the Act, demonstrating how the Act covers the vast 
majority of fringe credit transactions.  Part II surveys the 
substance of the Act to reveal the surprising emphasis the Act 
places on the Bureau governing fringe banking transactions.  The 
scope of the Bureau’s authority coupled with its substantive 
mandate to confront problems in fringe credit markets signal the 
new power and interest the federal government has taken in the 
fringe economy. 
Second, I argue that most of the justifications that have been 
offered for the Bureau regulating fringe credit are flawed.  To 
understand why people have contended the Bureau should 
govern the fringe economy, I surveyed the two most important 
academic articles arguing in favor of the Bureau, and I conducted 
an empirical study to measure the frequency of the rationales for 
the Bureau regulating fringe credit in media, government press 
releases, and testimony to Congress.  Part III presents the 
results of the study, and it assesses the different rationales for 
the Bureau intervening in fringe credit markets.  Some 
 
 7 The one exception is the Talent-Nelson Amendment aimed at stopping payday 
lenders from lending money to military personnel. 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2006).  See generally 
Patrick M. Aul, Note, Federal Usury Law for Service Members: The Talent-Nelson 
Amendment, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 163 (2008) (discussing the intent and effects of the 
Talent-Nelson Amendment). 
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important rationales, such as the idea that the Bureau is needed 
to make fringe credit contracts less opaque or to prevent fringe 
credit from causing borrowers to experience financial distress, 
fail to comprehend fringe banking transactions and their effects.  
Other rationales for the Bureau, however, represent solid 
opportunities for the Bureau to improve the functioning of fringe 
credit markets and protect consumers.  For instance, the Bureau 
can fill the need for a nimble regulator that can stop innovative 
ways fringe creditors avoid existing regulation.  I conclude by 
urging the Bureau to seize the opportunity to act and to solve 
real problems in the fringe economy, not problems that are 
merely assumed to exist without evidence. 
I.  THE FRINGE ECONOMY AND THE SCOPE OF THE CONSUMER 
FINANCIAL PROTECTION ACT 
For some time, legislators and commentators debated 
whether the Act should include pawnbrokers and payday 
lenders.8  With the possible exception of rent-to-own contracts, 
however, it is clear that fringe banking services to consumers are 
within the scope of the Act.  This part outlines which parts of the 
statute authorize the Bureau to regulate fringe credit. 
A. Coverage Generally 
The Act empowers the Bureau to “regulate the offering and 
provision of consumer financial products or services under the 
federal consumer financial laws.”9  In determining what 
consumer financial products or services means, it is important to 
note that the Bureau only has authority over consumer financial 
products and services.  The Act defines “consumer” as an 
individual or someone acting on behalf of an individual,10 
although it does not define an individual, and limits consumer 
financial products or services to those “offered or provided for use 
by consumers primarily for personal, family, or household 
purposes.”11  In light of these definitions, a portion of fringe 
banking activity will not fall under the Bureau’s authority 
because these products are used for business purposes, not 
personal ones.12  This definition should assuage the fears of those 
 
 8 Binyamin Appelbaum, Compromise Would Shield Some Lenders, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 11, 2010, at A14. 
 9 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 1011(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank]. 
 10 Dodd-Frank § 1002(4). 
 11 Dodd-Frank § 1002(5). 
 12 See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, Consumer Use and Government Regulation of Title 
Pledge Lending, 22 LOY. CONS. L. REV. 425, 449 (2010) (asserting that around twenty-five 
to thirty percent of auto-title loans are taken out by small businesses). 
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who think that the Bureau’s regulations will prevent small 
businesses from accessing credit.13 
The definition for financial products and services reveals the 
lion’s share of what the Act covers.  The Act offers a list of 
transactions that it defines as financial products or services.  
Most significantly, the term includes “extending credit and 
servicing loans, including acquiring, purchasing, selling, 
brokering, or other extensions of credit.”14  Credit is given the 
same expansive definition as debt is in the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act15 and is given a more expansive definition than in 
the Truth in Lending Act.16  Credit means “the right granted by a 
person to a consumer to defer payment of a debt, incur debt and 
defer its payment, or purchase property or services and defer 
payment for such purchase.”17 
Based on this provision alone, the bulk of fringe banking 
transactions fall within the scope of the Act.  In payday loans, 
auto-title loans, secured credit cards, and pawn loans, the lender 
generally directly extends credit to consumers.  This definition 
encompasses the activity of payday and auto-title lenders who act 
as credit service organizations and merely charge a fee for 
connecting customers with lenders18 because it includes firms 
that broker extensions of credit.19 
 
 13 See id. at 425–26 (expressing concern that the creation of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau could eliminate auto title lending which would “create hardship for 
many Americans who rely on auto title lending [such as unbanked consumers and 
independent small businesses] to meet urgent short-term expenses for utilities, housing 
and home repairs, and business expenses”). 
 14 Dodd-Frank § 1002(15)(A)(i). 
 15 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (2006) (“The term ‘debt’ means any obligation or alleged 
obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, 
property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for 
personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced 
to judgment.”). 
 16 15 U.S.C. § 1602(e) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(14) (2010) (“Credit means the right to 
defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment.”). 
 17 Dodd-Frank § 1002(7). 
 18 For a discussion of how payday lenders operate as credit service organizations, see 
Mary Spector, Taming the Beast: Payday Loans, Regulatory Efforts, and Unintended 
Consequences, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 961, 983–95 (2008). 
 19 Dodd-Frank § 1002(15)(A)(i).  Not only is the definition of credit more expansive in 
the Consumer Financial Protection Act than the Truth in Lending Act, the Truth in 
Lending Act’s restrictions on who is a creditor are not found in the Consumer Financial 
Protection Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (2006) (“The term ‘creditor’ refers only to a person 
who both (1) regularly extends, whether in connection with loans, sales of property or 
services, or otherwise, consumer credit which is payable by agreement in more than four 
installments or for which the payment of a finance charge is or may be required, and (2) is 
the person to whom the debt arising from the consumer credit transaction is initially 
payable on the face of the evidence of indebtedness or, if there is no such evidence of 
indebtedness, by agreement.”). 
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In some cases, the statute even specifies that fringe banking 
transactions are governed by the Bureau.  For instance, check 
cashing is defined as a financial service.20  Also, one section 
empowering the Bureau to obtain reports and conduct 
examinations of a limited number of non-depository entities 
specifically gives the Bureau such powers over anyone who 
“offers or provides to a consumer a payday loan.”21  Thus, it is 
clear that the Act is intended to cover payday loans. 
There are several groups exempted from the Act’s coverage, 
but in discussing these exemptions, the Act carefully specifies 
that fringe transactions are included under the Bureau’s power.  
The Act exempts tax preparers from the Bureau’s authority,22 but 
the Act excludes firms offering refund anticipation loans from 
this exemption.23  In a controversial provision,24 the Act exempts 
car dealerships,25 but it still includes companies commonly 
considered to offer car loans in the fringe economy—car 
dealerships that directly offer loans to customers and do not 
assign the loans to third parties.26 
It is possible that some fringe banking firms will be exempt 
from the Bureau’s power if the Bureau itself exempts them.  The 
Act gives the Bureau the power to exempt any business from any 
provision of the Act or rule promulgated by the Bureau.27  The 
factors the Bureau must consider in exempting a category of 
firms include the assets of the category of firms, the volume of 
transactions in which the firm engages, and “existing provisions 
of law which are applicable to the consumer financial product or 
service and the extent to which such provisions provide 
consumers with adequate protections.”28  Pawnshops are the 
 
 20 Dodd-Frank § 1002(15)(A)(vi). 
 21 Dodd-Frank § 1024(a)(1)(E). 
 22 Dodd-Frank § 1027(d). 
 23 Dodd-Frank § 1027(d)(2)(B) (“For purposes of this subsection, extending or 
brokering credit is not a customary and usual accounting activity, or incidental thereto.”). 
 24 For an account of the controversy, see Appelbaum, supra note 8. 
 25 Dodd-Frank § 1029(a) (“Except as permitted in subsection (b), the Bureau may not 
exercise any rulemaking, supervisory, enforcement or any other authority, including any 
authority to order assessments, over a motor vehicle dealer that is predominantly 
engaged in the sale and servicing of motor vehicles, the leasing and servicing of motor 
vehicles, or both.”). 
 26 Dodd-Frank § 1029(b)(2)(B) (“Subsection (a) shall not apply to any person, to the 
extent that such person . . . operates a line of business . . . in which . . . the extension of 
retail credit or retail leases are provided directly to consumers; and . . . the contract 
governing such extension of retail credit or retail leases is not routinely assigned to an 
unaffiliated third party finance or leasing source . . . .”). 
 27 Dodd-Frank § 1022(b)(3). 
 28 Dodd-Frank § 1022(b)(3)(B). 
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most likely possibility because they are declining in number29 
and they are extensively regulated by every state.30 
Finally, the Act has built into it a mechanism to prevent 
lenders from circumventing regulation by disguising credit sales 
as sales of other products or services.  Reports indicate some 
fringe bankers have created such schemes in attempt to avoid 
state interest rate limits.31  To prevent this strategic behavior, 
the Act clarifies that although the Bureau does not have 
authority to regulate a “merchant, retailer, or seller of any 
nonfinancial good or service,”32 this exemption 
does not apply to any credit transaction or collection of debt . . . in 
which the credit extended significantly exceeds the market value of 
the nonfinancial good or service provided, or the Bureau otherwise 
finds that the sale of the nonfinancial good or service is done as a 
subterfuge, so as to evade or circumvent the provisions of this title.33 
B. Pawnshops as Exchange Facilitators? 
One commentator has argued that the Act singles out 
pawnshops for a study, which would reinforce the belief that 
pawnshops are covered by the Act.34  The Act calls for a report on 
exchange facilitators,35 and the commentator argues that the 
report thus refers to pawnshops: 
Among other kinds of fringe financial services, pawn shops as a source 
of temporary credit is suspected to be asset-stripping and predatory.  
The Bureau must conduct a study on consumers who use exchange 
facilitators for transactions primarily for personal, family, or 
household purpose to analyze the effect of these firms on consumer 
credit.36 
This is almost certainly not right.  The Act’s definition of an 
“exchange facilitator” is a person who  
 
 29 See John Caskey, Fringe Banking and the Rise of Payday Lending, in Credit 
Markets for the Poor 26 (Patrick Bolton & Howard Rosenthal eds., 2005) (noting that the 
growth in pawnbroking stopped around 1997 and in “many states, the number of 
pawnshops actually declined between 2000 and 2002”). 
 30 See generally Oeltjen, supra note 5 (discussing the effect of state regulations on 
the pawnshop industry). 
 31 See Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 
MINN. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (2002) (reporting that some payday lenders avoided rate caps by 
selling advertising space to consumers). 
 32 Dodd-Frank § 1027(a)(1). 
 33 Dodd-Frank § 1027(a)(2)(B). 
 34 TIM FERNHOLZ, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL 
PROTECTION BUREAU: TOOLS, TRANSITIONS, AND CHOICES 9 (2010), available at 
http://pubcit.typepad.com/files/fernholz_cfpb_10-2010_final.pdf. 
 35 Dodd-Frank § 1079. 
 36 FERNHOLZ, supra note 34, at 9. 
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facilitates, for a fee, an exchange of like kind property by entering into 
an agreement with a taxpayer by which the exchange facilitator 
acquires from the taxpayer the contractual rights to sell the 
taxpayer’s relinquished property and transfers a replacement 
property to the taxpayer as a qualified intermediary (within the 
meaning of Treasury Regulations section 1.1031(k)-1(g)(4)) or enters 
into an agreement with the taxpayer to take title to a property as an 
exchange accommodation titleholder (within the meaning of Revenue 
Procedure 2000-37) or enters into an agreement with a taxpayer to act 
as a qualified trustee or qualified escrow holder (within the meaning 
of Treasury Regulations section 1.1031(k)-1(g)(3)).37 
The term exchange facilitator, in both the Act’s definition 
and common usage within the tax community, references tax 
transactions where an intermediary facilitates a tax-deferred 
exchange under section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code.38  
Thus, while pawnshops are covered in the Act because they 
extend credit, the Act does not call for a special report on the 
industry. 
C. Rent-to-Own 
The only fringe banking product not clearly covered by the 
statute is rent-to-own.  Commentary has covered a wide 
spectrum in discussing whether rent-to-own is covered by the 
Act.  Some reports about39 and analyses of40 the Act conclude that 
 
 37 Dodd-Frank § 1079(d)(1). 
 38 See FEA Calls New Financial Reform Bill a Good Start Toward Federal 
Regulation, NEWSWIRE TODAY, July 21, 2010, http://www.newswiretoday.com/news/74271/ 
(reporting that the Federation of Exchange Accommodators support this provision of the 
Dodd-Frank Act because they want federal regulation of their tax-related conduct). 
 39 See Ezra Klein, Digging Into Finance’s Pay Dirt, WASH. POST, July 25, 2010, at G1 
(“Sometime this spring, Democrats stopped calling Sen. Chris Dodd's bill ‘financial 
reform’ and started calling it ‘Wall Street reform.’  Most of the headlines and news 
releases on the sweeping legislation focused on the well-heeled, white-collar, upper crust 
of finance—investment banks, private-equity firms and hedge funds.  But the bill 
President Obama signed into law Thursday will have a lot to say about payday lenders 
and check cashers and rent-to-own furniture stores—the blue-collar, far-off-Main Street 
joints.”);; Jonathan D. Epstein, Financial Reforms Mean Big Changes, BUFFALO NEWS, 
July 4, 2010, at C1 (“The new consumer financial protection bureau would have extensive 
power to make and enforce regulations, even over industries previously subject to little 
federal regulation.  It will have authority over traditional products such as mortgage, 
credit card, student and other consumer loans, as well as non-banks like check-cashers, 
pawn shops, payday lenders and rent-to-own stores.”);; Jessica Machetta, New Federal 
Oversight Bureau to Crack Down on Payday Lenders, MISSOURINET, Nov. 23, 2010, 
http://www.missourinet.com/2010/11/23/new-federal-oversight-bureau-to-crack-down-on-
payday-lenders/ (“[Brenda Procter of the University of Missouri] believes this new step of 
hiring a director to oversee non-depository institutions such as payday lenders and rent-
to-own stores will give some focused attention to the issues that consumer advocates have 
requested for years.”). 
 40 See JAY KIM ET AL., DORSEY, DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT 17 (2010), http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/DoddFrankOverview.pdf 
(“The BCFP [Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection] is authorized to regulate the 
activities of any person or entity (a ‘covered person’) engaged in the business of providing 
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rent-to-own is covered by the Act.  Some consumer advocates 
have noted it is unclear whether rent-to-own falls within the 
Act’s control,41 and some industry sources have similarly 
expressed concern over whether the Bureau will regulate rent-to-
own.42 
But beyond comments made mostly in passing, there has not 
been a clear exposition of the Act’s coverage of rent-to-own based 
on the legislative history, the position taken by supporters of the 
Act, and the text of the statute.  The following surveys the 
evidence from each of these categories and concludes that 
although the legislative history and positions taken by 
supporters do not give a clear indication about whether the law is 
intended to cover rent-to-own, the text of the statute suggests 
rent-to-own is not covered by the Act. 
First, the legislative history is inconclusive regarding 
whether rent-to-own falls within the Bureau’s purview.  The 
rent-to-own industry tried to obtain language in the Act which 
 
consumer financial products or services, including taking deposits; extending credit; 
servicing loans; leasing or brokering leases of real or personal property on a rent-to-own 
basis . . . .”); SUTHERLAND, NEW WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS FOR FINANCIAL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES 1 (2010), http://www.sutherland.com (follow “Alerts+Publications” hyperlink, 
search “new whistleblower protections”) (“The whistleblower must be in the employ of a 
‘covered person’ (or a service provider assisting such covered person).  A covered person is 
defined by Title X as any individual or incorporated entity that provides ‘consumer 
financial products or services,’ defined broadly to include lending (including payday 
lending), loan servicing, ‘rent-to-own’ leasing . . . .”); RICHARD P. HACKETT & FRANK H. 
BISHOP JR., PIERCE ATWOOD LLP, WORKING SUMMARY OF THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL 
PROTECTION ACT OF 2010 9 n.26 (2010), http://pierceatwood.com/files/ 
811_WorkingSummaryoftheConsumerFinancialProtectionActof2010.pdf (“This exclusion 
does not apply if: (i) the person assigns, sells, or otherwise conveys non-delinquent debt 
(i.e., sells the consumer obligation); (ii) the credit extended significantly exceeds the 
market value of the non-financial good or service provided (e.g., rent-to-own); or (iii) the 
person regularly extends such credit and the credit is subject to a finance charge.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 41 Special Double Issue on the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Bill, NAT’L CONSUMER 
L. CENTER, July–Aug. 2010, at 7, http://www.nclc.org/dodd-frank/nclc-rpts-ccu-jul-aug-
2010-web.pdf.   
 42 Consumer Protection Agency Passes Key Committee, TARGETED NEWS SERVICE, 
Oct. 22, 2009, available at http://www.rtohq.org/02826apro-consumer-protection-agency-
passes-key-committee.html (“The U.S. House Financial Services Committee today 
approved creation of a controversial Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA), 
charged with writing rules for mortgage and credit card lenders and other financial 
service providers which could include rent-to-own.”);; Rent-A-Center Inc. Outlook Revised 
To Stable; ‘BB’ Corporate Credit, All Other Ratings Affirmed, MARKET NEWS PUBLISHING, 
Nov. 10, 2009 (“The outlook revision to stable from positive reflects our reassessment of 
the probability of a ratings upgrade over the near term, and not any recent substantial 
unfavorable developments with respect to potential future RTO industry regulation under 
the proposed Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009 (CFPA).  The 
reassessment reflects uncertainty surrounding whether the CFPA will be passed, what 
industries (including RTO) may be regulated by the act, and the impact of any such 
regulation.  If we had greater assurance that Rent-A-Center would not be substantially 
negatively impacted by CFPA regulation, we would give consideration to a ratings 
upgrade.”). 
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would have explicitly excluded rent-to-own, and this effort failed, 
potentially signaling that the Act includes rent-to-own.43  Some 
Senators balked at the idea of exempting rent-to-own from the 
Act’s coverage.44  On the other hand, Charles Schumer attempted 
to insert language into the Act to ensure the Act covered rent-to-
own and failed to get this language passed into law, suggesting 
the opposite conclusion, that rent-to-own is not covered.45 
Several pieces of evidence from discussions and testimony 
about the Act suggest that some Senators thought rent-to-own 
was covered.  For instance, consider this exchange between 
Senators Dodd and Schumer when discussing the differences 
between the bill the House and Senate passed: 
DODD: Could we try, I’m not going to—as I said I’m not going to offer 
the amendment now but could we try to deal with the non-bank 
payday lenders and the non-bank rent to own type people who escape 
regulation here? 
DODD: Well, we’ve raised that with the other side . . . 
SCHUMER: The House put it in.  No, the House is OK with it.  The 
House has it in their bill.46 
 
 43 Letter from Americans for Financial Reform, to Christopher Dodd, Chairman, 
Senate Banking Committee (Dec. 7, 2009), available at http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/ 
2009/12/consumer-financial-protection-agency-should-cover-rent-to-own-transactions/ (“In 
particular, we write to urge you to reject any amendments that would exempt the Rent-to-
Own industry from coverage by the CFPA.  Such an amendment was offered in House, 
phrased as an exclusion from the definition of credit of ‘a bailment or lease which is 
terminable without penalty at any time by the consumer.’”);; Victoria McGrane, Industries 
Covet CFPA Exemptions, POLITICO.COM, Oct. 21, 2009, http://www.politico.com/news/ 
stories/1009/28538.html (“‘Every industry is working hard to weaken the bill,’ said Ed 
Mierzwinski, director of U.S. PIRG’s consumer program, observing that even the rent-to-
own industry is getting help seeking its own exemption from Democratic Rep. Joe Baca of 
California.  ‘Rent-to-own is just another predatory lender,’ he said.”). 
 44 See 156 CONG. REC. S3303-03 (daily ed. May 6, 2010) (statement of Senator 
Charles Schumer) (“And many of these businesses-payday lenders, rent-to-own 
companies-currently operate below the radar screen to prey on vulnerable communities.  
How can we exempt some of these payday lenders and rent-to-own companies?  I have 
seen them prey on poor people in my State.  How can we exempt them from regulation 
when they often are worse than many of the financial institutions?”). 
 45 See 156 CONG. REC. S3065-02 (daily ed. May 4, 2010) (statement of Senator 
Charles Schumer) (“I am sponsoring an amendment to expand the enforcement authority 
of the Consumer Protection Bureau over all nonbanks, such as payday lenders and rent-
to-own companies, to make sure consumers are protected no matter who they rely on for 
financial services.”).  See also Brian Tumulty, New York Senators Buck Wall Street, 
GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 29, 2010 (“[Schumer’s] working with Democratic Sen. Jack 
Reed of Rhode Island on an amendment that would create an independent Consumer 
Financial Protection Agency.  The current bill would make the agency part of the Federal 
Reserve.  Schumer also hopes to cosponsor an amendment with Sen. Kay Hagan, D-N.C., 
that would put payday lenders and rent-to-own centers under federal regulatory 
control.”). 
 46 House/Senate Conference Committee Holds a Meeting on the Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, FD (FAIR DISCLOSURE) WIRE, June 22, 2010. 
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Testimony from people supporting the Act also assumes 
rent-to-own is covered.  For instance, in support of an 
amendment to the Act regarding military families, Senator Jack 
Reed stated: 
Rent-to-own loans.  This is where you go to a shop and you say I would 
like to rent a TV for 30 days because you am [sic] deploying in 45 
days.  Then you don’t deploy so you keep it, and in some cases you end 
up paying two to three times the retail price of the appliance.  At least 
individual soldiers have to be informed of those practices and know 
about it.  We have to be sure they are getting that information . . . .  
That is what we want to do—coordinate these activities through a 
military liaison at a consumer financial protection agency.  We want 
to do that because it is the right thing to do and because if we cannot 
protect the men and women who are protecting us, then we have to 
ask seriously whether we are doing our job.  I know they are doing 
their job.47 
Of course this testimony merely represents a single Senator’s 
view about the law, and it is not even clear from the statement 
that Senator Reed believes rent-to-own is covered by the Act, as 
opposed to Reed believing the Act should cover rent-to-own.  In 
the end, this testimony is like the other evidence of legislative 
intent—inconclusive. 
With the evidence from legislative history being inconclusive, 
the text of the statute—the starting point for statutory 
interpretation48—is the best guide for determining rent-to-own’s 
status under the Act.  As is the case with many consumer 
protection laws, how rent-to-own is categorized will determine 
whether it is covered by the Act. 
If rent-to-own is treated as a lease, it will almost certainly 
fall outside the Bureau’s authority.  The Act only governs leases 
of personal property within the definition of a financial product 
or service if “the lease is on a non-operating basis . . . [and] the 
initial term of the lease is at least 90 days . . . .”49  Rent-to-own 
 
 47 Senator Jack Reed, Floor Statement Introducing Joint Amendment to Strengthen 
Consumer Protection for Military Families, STATES NEWS SERVICE, May 7, 2010.  See also 
Media Conference Call with Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL); Senator Jack Reed (D-RI); 
And Holly Petraeus, Director, Better Business Bureau Military Line; Subject: Protection for 
Military Families Against Abusive Lending Practices, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, May 12, 
2010 (“They’re numerous.  They’re legion.  And, you know, we’ve got Marine squad leaders 
who need to do a lot more than, you know, take care of consumer activities of their 
Marines.  This is something that should be done systematically by a consumer protection 
agency.  Our families, our military families are vulnerable not just to auto dealers.  
They’ve [sic] vulnerable to pay-day loans who offer up to—interest rates up to 800 
percent.  You know, back where I come from, you know, that’s—that would be frowned on 
by people who, you know, aren’t legitimate businessmen and women.  Rent-to-own loans, 
two to three times the price of the goods.  We could go on and on and on.”). 
 48 United States v. Ron Pair Entrs., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1988). 
 49 Dodd-Frank § 1002(15)(A)(ii). 
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contracts are almost universally for less than 90 days, causing 
them to fall outside the Act.50  On the other hand, if rent-to-own 
is considered an extension of credit, it will fall within the basic 
definition of a financial product or service.51 
There is a significant debate both in courts and in academic 
commentary about whether rent-to-own transactions are sales on 
credit or leases.52  People who argue it is a lease focus on the fact 
that the consumer does not have any obligation to complete the 
contract but can terminate it at any time.53  Those who claim it is 
a credit sale emphasize the fact that the transaction is the 
functional equivalent of credit even if the form is different 
because the end result is people acquire ownership of a good over 
time and pay a premium for the good.54 
The Bureau could govern rent-to-own transactions either if 
they fall within the Act’s definition of credit or if the Bureau 
determines rent-to-own is a subterfuge to avoid federal consumer 
credit laws, like the Truth in Lending Act.  The latter power is 
found in a provision of the definition of financial product or 
service which states that the Bureau can define rent-to-own as a 
financial product or service by rule “if the Bureau finds that such 
financial product or service is entered into or conducted as a 
subterfuge or with a purpose to evade any Federal consumer 
financial law.”55  The fact that some people consider rent-to-own 
a disguised credit sale might empower the Bureau to regulate it. 
One way we could imagine determining whether rent-to-own 
is credit is by looking to state law.  Different states define the 
transaction differently—most treating it as a lease by statute,56 
and some considering it a credit-sale by judicial decision.57  Based 
on differences in state statutes, it is possible the Bureau would 
only have authority over rent-to-own transactions in states that 
treat the transaction as a form of credit.  This, however, is 
 
 50 See generally Jim Hawkins, Renting the Good Life, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2041 
(2008) (discussing the rent-to-own industry and examining arguments for regulating it). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 2048 (collecting arguments for both sides). 
 53 Id. at 2051. 
 54 Id. at 2050. 
 55 Dodd-Frank § 1002(15)(A)(xi). 
 56 See, e.g., CAL CIV. CODE § 1812.622(d) (West 2010) (“‘Rental-purchase 
agreement’ . . . means an agreement between a lessor and a consumer pursuant to which 
the lessor rents or leases, for valuable consideration, personal property for use by a 
consumer for personal, family, or household purposes for an initial term not exceeding 
four months that may be renewed or otherwise extended, if under the terms of the 
agreement the consumer acquires an option or other legally enforceable right to become 
owner of the property.”). 
 57 Perez v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 892 A.2d 1255, 1268 (N.J. 2006); Miller v. Colortyme, 
Inc., 518 N.W.2d 544, 549 (Minn. 1994). 
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unlikely because the Bureau or any court interpreting the Act 
will have to look to the Act’s definition of credit, not any 
individual state’s definition of credit.  The Act sets out a 
definition of credit.58  It does not defer to states’ definitions of 
credit, so courts will have to analyze transactions in light of the 
Act’s definition regardless of state law.  In similar contexts, 
courts look only to the federal statute’s definition of a term to 
determine its meaning.  For example, in determining whether 
rent-to-own transactions are credit within the meaning of the 
Truth in Lending Act, courts do not consider state law but 
instead just evaluate the definition of credit in the Truth in 
Lending Act statute.59 
Looking instead to the Act itself, it seems unlikely rent-to-
own is credit.  Credit means (1) “the right granted by a person to 
a consumer to defer payment of a debt, incur debt and defer its 
payment” or (2) “the right granted by a person to . . . purchase 
property or services and defer payment for such purchase.”60  
Rent-to-own agreements fall outside both of these parts of the 
definition.  The statute does not define debt, but debt is 
commonly defined as an obligation to pay money arising out of a 
transaction.61  Rent-to-own-agreements do not involve taking on 
debt because the rental agreements obligate consumers to pay for 
rental periods at the start of the rental period, not the end, so the 
consumer generally does not owe money because of the 
agreement.62 
Additionally, rent-to-own agreements do not involve 
deferring payment for a purchase.  Like debt, the statute does 
not define purchase, but in most cases purchase involves a 
transfer of an interest in property for money.63  Because 
 
 58 Dodd-Frank § 1002(7). 
 59 See Ortiz v. Rental Mgmt., Inc., 65 F.3d 335, 341 (3d Cir. 1995) (determining rent-
to-own is not “credit” based on the definition in the statute and the Regulations 
promulgated to implement it and the federal commentary on the statute); Starks v. Rent-
A-Center, No. 3-89-0786, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20099 (D. Minn. May 16, 
1990) (concluding that rent-to-own contracts are not extensions of credit under TILA even 
though the court found that rent-to-own contracts were credit sales under Minnesota 
law); In re Crawford, No. 90-50066, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 2515 (E.D. Bankr. Ky. 1992) 
(assessing whether rent-to-own was a credit sale under TILA completely separately from 
assessing rent-to-own’s status under Kentucky law). 
 60 Dodd-Frank § 1002(7). 
 61 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (2006) (reporting the Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act’s definition of debt). 
 62 Even cases finding that rent-to-own agreements are credit sales state that rent-to-
own does not entail accumulating debt. See Miller, 518 N.W.2d at 549. 
 63 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 3372(c)(2) (2006) (“It is deemed to be a purchase of fish or 
wildlife in violation of this Act for a person to obtain for money or other 
consideration . . . (A) guiding, outfitting, or other services; or (B) a hunting or fishing 
license or permit . . . .”);; U.C.C. § 1-201(29) (2007) (“‘Purchase’ means taking by sale, 
lease, discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, security interest, issue or reissue, gift, 
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payments for renting are due before the rental period begins, 
rent-to-own does not entail deferring payment for purchasing 
even the right to possess the goods during the rental period.  
Also, the consumer must pay in advance to actually acquire 
ownership of the goods, so purchasing the title of the goods is not 
deferred.  The only way rent-to-own involves a purchase under 
common definitions of that term is if it is a disguised deferred 
purchase—i.e., the consumer really purchases title of the goods 
at the start of the first rental period but defers payment for the 
title until the end of the rental agreement. 
More compelling than the definition of credit, however, is the 
section of definitions dealing with leases.  That section sets out a 
specific type of lease that is a financial product or service under 
the Act.64  Under the principle of expressio unius, the fact it 
states one type of lease and does not state other types of leases 
suggests that all leases not covered by the stated definition are 
not financial products.65 
More to the point, the section covering leases is plainly 
aimed at lease contracts that are disguises for credit sales.  The 
only leases covered by the Act are leases that are “the functional 
equivalent of purchase finance arrangements.”66  Thus, the 
statute implies that a deferred purchase that is disguised as a 
lease should not be considered credit but should instead be 
covered only if it meets the requirements of the section of leases.  
The Bureau merely finding that a lease is a disguise for a credit 
sale should not be enough for the Bureau to govern such a lease 
or to consider the transaction to be a subterfuge.  Instead, 
deciding that a transaction is the functional equivalent of a credit 
sale merely meets one of the parts of the definition of what leases 
are financial products or services. 
In the end, it appears that almost all fringe banking 
products except rent-to-own are within the Bureau’s purview.  In 
surveying the definitions in the Act, this part has taken the first 
step in establishing the claim that the Act empowers the Bureau 
to intervene into fringe credit markets because it demonstrates 
the Bureau has power over fringe banking.  The next part looks 
at the substantive rules of the Act to illustrate the impressive 
opportunity Congress has given the Bureau to regulate fringe 
credit. 
 
or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property.”). 
 64 Dodd-Frank § 1002(15)(A)(ii). 
 65 Expressio unius is the principle of statutory interpretation which states that the 
expression of one thing means the exclusion of another. Chevron U.S.A. v. Echazabel, 536 
U.S. 73, 80 (2002). 
 66 Dodd-Frank § 1002(15)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). 
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II.  THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION ACT’S SUBSTANTIAL 
POWER TO REGULATE FRINGE CREDIT 
This part discusses the major components of the Consumer 
Financial Protection Act that will affect fringe banking and 
reveals how the federal government will now be directly involved 
in the fringe economy in a substantial way.  Fringe banking 
permeates the bill.  Even beyond the components this section 
analyzes in depth, which all involve fringe banking, consider the 
following provisions which demonstrate the sustained attention 
the Act pays to fringe banking: 
 The Act instructs the Bureau’s Director to establish an 
entire unit dedicated solely to consumers who are 
unbanked or underbanked.67 
 The Office of Financial Education created by the Act is 
charged with moving people from fringe banking firms to 
mainstream financial institutions.68 
 In creating the Consumer Advisory Board, the Director 
must seek “representatives of depository institutions that 
primarily serve underserved communities.”69 
 To encourage less reliance on fringe banking services, the 
Act requires “[e]ach of the Federal banking agencies and 
the National Credit Union Administration [to] provide 
guidelines to financial institutions under the jurisdiction 
of the agency regarding the offering of low-cost remittance 
transfers and no-cost or low-cost basic consumer accounts, 
as well as agency services to remittance transfer 
providers.”70 
The following goes beyond these few examples to explain the 
power the substance of the Act gives to the Bureau to affect 
fringe banking. 
A. Research 
A major focus of the Bureau will be research,71 and the Act 
instructs the Bureau’s Director to create a research unit.72  
 
 67 Dodd-Frank § 1013(b)(2) (“The Director shall establish a unit whose functions 
shall include providing information, guidance, and technical assistance regarding the 
offering and provision of consumer financial products or services to traditionally 
underserved consumers and communities.”). 
 68 Dodd-Frank § 1013(d)(2)(C) (setting as a priority of the Office of Financial 
Education the provision of “opportunities for consumers to access . . . savings, borrowing, 
and other services found at mainstream financial institutions”). 
 69 Dodd-Frank § 1014(b). 
 70 Dodd-Frank § 1073(c). 
 71 Dodd-Frank § 1021(c)(3) (stating a primary function of the Bureau will be 
“collecting, researching, monitoring, and publishing information relevant to the 
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Remarkably, three of the six foci of the research unit directly 
relate to fringe banking, and the other three are indirectly 
related to it. 
The first area the Act directs the research unit to study is 
developments in credit markets, “including market areas of 
alternative consumer financial products or services with high 
growth rates and areas of risk to consumers.”73  The phrase 
“alternative consumer financial products or services” mirrors 
almost exactly a common name for fringe banking: alternative 
financial services.  While not directly stating that the unit should 
research fringe banking, this language and the fact fringe 
banking is a high growth industry that many consider a risk to 
consumers suggest that this agenda item for the research unit is 
directed at fringe banking.  The other two areas the unit must 
research involve fringe banking customers in a much clearer 
way, as one directs the unit to research “access to fair and 
affordable credit for traditionally underserved communities,”74 
and the other demands research about “experiences of 
traditionally underserved consumers, including un-banked and 
under-banked consumers.”75 
The other three areas of research do not explicitly involve 
only fringe banking, but they all relate to concerns people have 
expressed about fringe credit: disclosure and suboptimal 
consumer decision-making.  The research unit must analyze 
consumers’ understanding of disclosures, awareness of risks and 
costs of credit, and behavior regarding financial products and 
services.76  Each of these three items has been the focus of 
significant academic debate about fringe banking,77 and so a 
study of any one of them is likely to involve fringe credit. 
Given the preeminence of fringe banking in the Bureau’s 
research agenda, it is likely the Bureau will produce a significant 
number of reports about fringe credit and will fill in some holes 
in the academic literature about fringe banking.  The next 
section outlines one source of data from which the Bureau will 
 
functioning of markets for consumer financial products and services to identify risks to 
consumers and the proper functioning of such markets”). 
 72 Dodd-Frank § 1013(b)(1). 
 73 Dodd-Frank § 1013(b)(1)(A). 
 74 Dodd-Frank § 1013(b)(1)(B). 
 75 Dodd-Frank § 1013(b)(1)(F). 
 76 Dodd-Frank § 1013(b)(1)(C)–(E). 
 77 See generally Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational 
Borrower: Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided “Reform” of Bankruptcy Law, 84 
TEX. L. REV. 1481 (2006) (providing an in-depth analysis of these three items in the 
context of fringe banking). 
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draw: information obtained directly from fringe banking firms 
through the Bureau’s supervision powers. 
B. Monitoring and Supervision 
Fringe banking will also be affected in a second innovation 
found in the Act: the Act empowers the Bureau to monitor and 
supervise nondepositories.78  These powers have the potential to 
dramatically increase the amount of data available about fringe 
banking firms, but also to impose costs on firms operating in 
these markets. 
First, the Act mandates that the Bureau “monitor for risks to 
consumers in the offering or provision of consumer financial 
products or services.”79  As in other contexts, the fringe economy 
should play an important role in this monitoring because the Act 
instructs the Bureau to allocate its resources for monitoring in 
light of “the extent, if any, to which the risks of a consumer 
financial product or service may disproportionately affect 
traditionally underserved consumers . . . .”80 
This monitoring power has the potential to supply the 
Bureau with substantial information about the fringe economy 
because the Bureau can require covered entities to file special or 
annual reports or to submit answers to questions from the 
Bureau.81  This power to obtain information even extends to 
entities that are not determined to be covered by the Act; the 
Bureau can require firms to file annual reports so that the 
Bureau can assess whether they are covered by the Act.82 
In addition to requiring reports, the Bureau can also require 
fringe banking firms to register with the federal government.83  
Registration requirements in some cases will be duplicative of 
the extensive state registration rules,84 so the Act requires the 
Bureau to consult with state agencies when promulgating its 
rules.85 
 
 78 Dodd-Frank § 1024(b). 
 79 Dodd-Frank § 1022(c)(1). 
 80 Dodd-Frank § 1022(c)(2)(E). 
 81 Dodd-Frank § 1022(c)(4)(B)(ii). 
 82 Dodd-Frank § 1022(c)(5) (“In order to assess whether a nondepository is a covered 
person, as defined in section 1002, the Bureau may require such nondepository to file with 
the Bureau, under oath or otherwise, in such form and within such reasonable period of 
time as the Bureau may prescribe by rule or order, annual or special reports, or answers 
in writing to specific questions.”). 
 83 Dodd-Frank § 1022(c)(7)(A). 
 84 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 2202 (2010) (requiring title lenders to obtain 
licenses from the state); FLA. STAT. § 537.007 (2010) (same); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-46-
503 (2010) (same). 
 85 Dodd-Frank § 1022(c)(7)(C). 
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Second, in addition to monitoring, the Act empowers the 
Bureau to supervise some fringe lenders.  The Act specifically 
empowers the Bureau to supervise just three types of lenders: 
(1) mortgage originators, brokers, and servicers; (2) those offering 
education loans; and (3) payday lenders.86  The specific language 
of the section granting supervisory power over payday lenders is 
broad enough to include payday lenders operating in a variety of 
business models because it is not limited to companies that 
provide payday loans—it includes anyone who even offers them.87  
Thus, the Bureau will supervise payday lenders who operate as 
Credit Service Organizations that merely connect borrowers with 
third-party lenders.88 
In addition to these specific firms to be supervised, the Act 
sets out two general nets to catch other firms for supervision, 
both of which have a strong potential to bring in fringe creditors 
other than just payday lenders.  First, the Bureau can supervise 
anyone who is “a larger participant of a market for other 
consumer financial products or services . . . .”89  Several large 
pawnbrokers,90 auto-title lenders,91 and refund anticipation 
lenders92 are large publicly held companies and could easily fall 
into this category.  Second, the Bureau can supervise any person 
who “is engaging, or has engaged, in conduct that poses risks to 
consumers.”93  As Part III.C points out, many people believe 
fringe credit is risky for consumers, so the potential to draw in 
fringe lenders is substantial.  The upshot of these provisions is 
that payday lenders will certainly be supervised by the Bureau 
and many other fringe lenders have a strong potential to be 
supervised. 
Being supervised by the Bureau may require firms to 
produce “reports and conduct examinations on a periodic 
basis[;]”94 maintain a certain level of capital or bonds;95 submit to 
“background checks for principals, officers, directors, or key 
personnel[;]”96 and generate and maintain records so that the 
 
 86 Dodd-Frank § 1024(a)(1)(A), (D), (E). 
 87 Dodd-Frank § 1024(a)(1)(E) (granting power to supervise a person who “offers or 
provides to a consumer a payday loan”). 
 88 Spector, supra note 18, at 983–95. 
 89 Dodd-Frank § 1024(a)(1)(B). 
 90 Cash America International, Inc. is a pawnshop traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange listed under the symbol “CSH.” 
 91 EZ Corp. offers title loans and is traded on NASDAQ under the symbol “EZPW.” 
 92 Advance America is one of the largest payday lenders and is traded on the New 
York Stock Exchange under the symbol “AEA.” 
 93 Dodd-Frank § 1024(a)(1)(C). 
 94 Dodd-Frank § 1024(b)(1). 
 95 Dodd-Frank § 1024(b)(7)(C). 
 96 Id. 
Do Not Delete 12/7/2011 2:17 PM 
40 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 15:1 
Bureau can perform its supervisory function.97  These 
requirements could have a variety of effects in fringe markets.  
For instance, if only payday lenders are supervised, it could put 
other fringe lenders in a better competitive position because they 
will be able to avoid the costs payday lenders are paying for 
compliance.  More generally, capital requirements and 
substantial reporting requirements could favor larger firms and 
drive mom and pop shops out of business. 
It would be easy to underestimate the importance of this 
information-gathering function.  As David Skeel points out: 
The power to investigate and require data may be the most important 
power of all.  As a scholar seeking data, Warren was not a welcome 
presence at the office of the credit card banks.  But now banks are 
required to open their doors and answer questions about their 
business practices.98 
This observation is especially true for fringe banking 
operations that have not been subject to examinations like banks 
but, for the first time, will have to produce significant amounts of 
information for the Bureau. 
C. Rulemaking 
The Bureau’s ability to promulgate rules is the least 
delimited of its powers, has the least understood power, and has 
the greatest potential to affect businesses in the fringe economy.  
The Act empowers the Bureau to make rules supporting two 
goals: sections 1021(c)(5) and 1022(a) authorize rulemaking to 
enforce federal consumer protection laws,99 and section 1031(b) 
gives the Bureau the right to create rules to identify “unlawful, 
unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices . . . .”100  The 
Bureau’s power to write new rules to enforce existing federal 
consumer laws might affect fringe lenders, but there is little 
room for surprise here as the federal consumer laws are already 
on the books and have been implemented by other agencies 
writing rules for years.  The main effect of this rulemaking power 
will be that existing laws will be more stringently enforced. 
 
 97 Dodd-Frank § 1024(b)(7)(B). 
 98 DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 112 (2011). 
 99 Dodd-Frank § 1021(c)(5) (“The primary functions of the Bureau are . . . issuing 
rules, orders, and guidance implementing Federal consumer financial law.”);; § 1022(a) 
(“The Bureau is authorized to exercise its authorities under Federal consumer financial 
law to administer, enforce, and otherwise implement the provisions of Federal consumer 
financial law.”). 
 100 Dodd-Frank § 1031(b). 
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On the other hand, the Act’s instruction to create rules to 
regulate “unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts”101 has much more 
potential to affect fringe lenders.  None of these terms are 
explicitly defined by the Act.  The Act does give some indication 
of when the Bureau can define a practice as unfair and abusive, 
but it gives no guidance concerning defining acts as deceptive. 
The Bureau cannot define a practice as unfair “unless the 
Bureau has a reasonable basis to conclude that . . . the act or 
practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to 
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers; and 
such substantial injury is not outweighed by countervailing 
benefits to consumers or to competition.”102  The Bureau can only 
define an act as abusive if it: 
(1) materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand 
a term or condition of a consumer financial product or service; or 
(2) takes unreasonable advantage of— 
 (A) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the 
material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or service; 
 (B) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the 
consumer in selecting or using a consumer financial product or 
service; or 
 (C) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered person to 
act in the interests of the consumer.103 
In addition to this language in the Act, we have some idea of 
what sort of rules the Bureau will write for unfair and deceptive 
acts because the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has had a 
similar mandate for a considerable time.104  The FTC Act 
empowers the FTC to prevent businesses from engaging in unfair 
or deceptive acts,105 and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal 
Trade Commission Improvement Act gives the FTC rulemaking 
authority.106  Thus, the FTC’s enforcement activities against 
 
 101 Id. 
 102 Dodd-Frank § 1031(c)(1). 
 103 Dodd-Frank § 1031(d)(1)&(2). 
 104 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006) (using the same language as the Consumer Financial 
Protection Act when empowering the FTC to prevent unfair and deceptive acts or 
practices but omitting “abusive”). 
 105 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (“The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to 
prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of 
competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce.”). 
 106 See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B) (2006) (“[T]he Commission may prescribe . . . rules 
which define with specificity acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce (within the meaning of section 45(a)(1) of this title), 
except that the Commission shall not develop or promulgate any trade rule or regulation 
with regard to the regulation of the development and utilization of the standards and 
certification activities pursuant to this section.  Rules under this subparagraph may 
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unfair and deceptive conduct may help predict what conduct the 
Bureau will define as unfair and deceptive. 
Like the Consumer Financial Protection Act, the FTC Act 
does not define unfair or deceptive and only gives guidance about 
how to formulate rules relating to unfair acts.107  In the early 
1980s, the FTC issued policy statements on both unfairness and 
deception that are still routinely cited today.108  The following 
sections attempt to identify what unfair, deceptive, and abusive 
mean.  Because these terms do not have specific definitions, 
these sections demonstrate that they give substantial power to 
the Bureau to regulate fringe credit markets. 
i.  Unfair Acts or Practices 
The FTC’s policy statement on unfairness explains that an 
act or practice is “likely to cause substantial injury to consumers” 
only if the injury is a “monetary, economic, or other tangible 
harm”109 that is more than “trivial or speculative” and not 
subjective injuries like “embarrassment, emotional distress, 
etc.”110  In determining if consumers can reasonably avoid the 
injuries, the FTC looks to whether something about the act or 
practice unjustifiably hinders free market decision-making.111  
Thus, in most cases where the FTC claims an act is unfair, the 
consumer has been tricked in some way or there will be some sort 
of market failure.112  As Jean Braucher summarizes, “The FTC 
 
include requirements prescribed for the purpose of preventing such acts or practices.”). 
 107 15 U.S.C. § 45(n). 
 108 See Stephen Calkins, FTC Unfairness: An Essay, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1935, 1936 
(2000). 
 109 49 Fed. Reg. 7740, 7743 (Mar. 1, 1984); Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, 74 
Fed. Reg. 5498, 5502 (Jan. 29, 2009). 
 110 49 Fed. Reg. 7740, 7743 (Mar. 1, 1984). 
 111 49 Fed. Reg. 7740, 7744 (Mar. 1, 1984).  See also Unfair or Deceptive Acts or 
Practices, 74 Fed. Reg. 5498, 5503 (Jan. 29, 2009) (“An injury is not reasonably avoidable 
when consumers are prevented from effectively making their own decisions about 
whether to incur that injury . . . .  The test is not whether the consumer could have made 
a wiser decision but whether an act or practice unreasonably creates or takes advantage 
of an obstacle to the consumer’s ability to make that decision freely.”). 
 112 H.R. REP. NO. 98-156 (1983); FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness, (Dec. 17, 1980), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bpc/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm (“Normally we expect the 
marketplace to be self-correcting, and we rely on consumer choice—the ability of 
individual consumers to make their own private purchasing decisions without regulatory 
intervention—to govern the market.  We anticipate that consumers will survey the 
available alternatives, choose those that are most desirable and avoid those that are 
inadequate or unsatisfactory.  However, it has long been recognized that certain types of 
sales techniques may prevent consumers from effectively making their own decisions, and 
that corrective action may then become necessary.  Most of the Commission's unfairness 
matters are brought under these circumstances.  They are brought, not to second-guess 
the wisdom of particular consumer decisions, but rather to halt some form of seller 
behavior that unreasonably creates or takes advantage of an obstacle to the free exercise 
of consumer decisionmaking.  Sellers may adopt a number of practices that unjustifiably 
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has come to the initially surprising conclusion that unfairness in 
consumer contracts means gross inefficiency.”113  Under the 
statute and its policy statement, the FTC will only take action 
when the benefits of further regulation outweigh the costs to 
consumers and competition.114 
A recent case exemplifies how the FTC approaches 
unfairness.  In F.T.C. v. IFC Credit Corp., a telecommunications 
company leased telecommunications equipment to consumers.115  
The Equipment Rental Agreements contained a “hell or high 
water” clause which obligated the consumer to continue making 
rental payments even if the telecommunication services were 
terminated, despite the fact the services were the only purpose of 
the equipment.116  The FTC alleged that the business’ attempt to 
collect on the rental agreements “when they are worthless is 
unfair.”117  In deciding the issue, the court found that the practice 
caused a substantial injury to consumers because the cost of 
renting the worthless equipment was significant and because the 
practice affected many consumers.118  Furthermore, it found that 
the consumers could not reasonably avoid the injury, despite the 
fact they should have known about the hell or high water clause 
and had not been deceived under traditional contract law 
notions.119  The court explained: 
 
hinder such free market decisions.  Some may withhold or fail to generate critical price or 
performance data, for example, leaving buyers with insufficient information for informed 
comparisons.  Some may engage in overt coercion, as by dismantling a home appliance for 
‘inspection’ and refusing to reassemble it until a service contract is signed.  And some may 
exercise undue influence over highly susceptible classes of purchasers as by promoting 
fraudulent ‘cures’ to seriously ill cancer patients.  Each of these practices undermines an 
essential precondition to a free and informed consumer transaction, and, in turn, to a well 
functioning market.  Each of them is therefore properly banned as an unfair practice 
under the FTC Act.”). 
 113 Jean Braucher, Defining Unfairness: Empathy and Economic Analysis at the 
Federal Trade Commission, 68 B.U. L. REV. 349, 351 (1988). 
 114 49 Fed. Reg. 7740, 7745 (Mar. 1, 1984). 
 115 FTC v. IFC Credit Corp., 543 F. Supp. 2d 925, 928 (N.D. Ill. 2008). 
 116 Id. at 930 (“The ERA appeared to be a standard form equipment lease, covering 
both sides of a single page.  It made no mention of telecommunications services and 
covered only the rental of the equipment necessary to provide the services.  Its terms were 
straightforward and understandable.  The front side provided that the ‘renter’ agreed that 
the equipment would ‘not be used for personal, family or household purposes.’  Also on the 
first side, in bold type a bit above the signature line, the ERA stated that the 
‘obligations to make all Rental Payments for the entire term are not subject to 
set off, withholding or deduction for any reason whatsoever.’  Directly over the 
signature lines, also in bold-faced type but capitalized as well, the ERA stated: ‘THIS 
RENTAL MAY NOT BE CANCELLED OR TERMINATED EARLY.’”). 
 117 Id. at 945. 
 118 Id. (“Here the injuries were substantial, both in monetary terms and in numbers 
of consumers affected.  The total payments under an ERA over its five-year term ranged 
from $4,439 to $160,672, depending on the lease—even though the cost of a box never 
exceeded $1,300 and in a number of cases was less than $300.”). 
 119 Id. at 945–48. 
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While the consumers knew that their monthly payment was being 
allocated in prescribed percentages, that fact would have been 
meaningless to a reasonable consumer and would not have alerted the 
consumer of what was to come.  While the ERA said that the 
obligation to make monthly payments was unconditional, the 
consumers could not have reasonably anticipated that, to use Justice 
Cardozo’s phrase, “the doom of mere sterility was on the [transaction] 
from the beginning,” and that it was a virtual certainty, not merely a 
possibility inherent in any comparable transaction, that its contracted 
for telecommunications services would cease and they would be on the 
hook to an assignee.  Having no reason to anticipate the harm that 
was certain to befall them, there was no occasion for the consumers 
even to consider taking steps to avoid it.120 
Because the practice caused substantial injury that could not 
be avoided, it was considered unfair. 
How might unfairness factor into the rules the Bureau 
makes concerning fringe banking products?  It opens a 
significant number of practices up to scrutiny.  It will not be 
difficult for the Bureau to establish that some aspects of fringe 
transactions cause substantial harm because even if the actual 
dollar amount of each harm is low, fringe banking is a common 
source of credit,121 so many consumers will be affected.  Also, 
critics of fringe banking consider several different aspects of 
fringe transactions to be a result of market failures, meeting the 
test that consumers cannot reasonably avoid the harm.122 
The most likely target of rules based on unfairness is payday 
loan rollovers.  Payday lending appears to be a high priority to 
the Bureau,123 although it is possible the Bureau will first 
 
 120 Id. at 948. 
 121 See KARGER, supra note 4, at 6 (reporting the United States has more payday 
lending and check cashing stores than McDonald’s, Burger King, Target, Sears, JC 
Penney, and Wal-Mart locations combined). 
 122 See, e.g., Alan M. White, Behavior and Contract, 27 LAW & INEQ. 135, 159 (2009) 
(“Payday loans, for example, are described (falsely) as a short-term credit product, 
exploiting the consumer’s optimism bias that predicts an ability to pay the loan in full at 
the next payday, and discounts the inevitable recurrence of the cash shortage that 
prompted the loan.  ‘Framing,’ which consists of altering a consumer’s preferences by 
defining the menu from which choices are made, is also used by payday lenders. Payday 
lenders compare the extremely high Annual Percentage Rate (APR) of a payday loan to 
the cost of bank overdraft fees if the payday loan is not used (avoiding a loss) rather than, 
say, the much cheaper alternative of a cash advance on a credit card.”). 
 123 Ann Sanner, White House Consumer Adviser Gathers Input in Ohio, DAILY 
CALLER (Oct. 14, 2010), http://dailycaller.com/2010/10/14/obama-consumer-adviser-
gathers-input-in-ohio/ (“Warren told reporters before the round-table that payday lending 
would be a ‘high priority’ for the agency.  People should have access to small-dollar loans 
for emergencies, she said, but ‘a model that is designed to keep those families in a 
revolving door of debt is not good for families—and ultimately not good for the economy.’  
Warren said federal regulators would look at the business models used in payday lending, 
the costs to consumers and the actions states have taken to regulate it.”). 
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address credit cards and mortgages.124  Some payday lenders 
think the Bureau will address payday lending first because it is 
low hanging fruit and an easy early win for the Bureau.125  In 
any case, given the emphasis on payday lending in the Act itself 
and news stories about the Act, it is highly likely the Bureau will 
make rules about it. 
Rollovers are a probable place for the Bureau to start.  
“Rollover” refers to the practice of payday borrowers paying just 
the interest due on their loans and rolling over the principal for 
another loan period and thereby incurring another interest fee.126  
Although an amendment to limit rollovers in the Act itself 
failed,127 Warren has criticized rollovers both in her academic 
writing128 and in her activities as a special advisor to President 
Obama;129 some experts have claimed that the Bureau has the 
 
 124 See Janet Bodnar, Elizabeth Warren Explains What We Can Expect from the New 
Consumer Agency, KIPLINGER (Nov. 24, 2010), http://community.nasdaq.com/News/2010-
11/elizabeth-warren-explains-what-we-can-expect-from-the-new-consumer-agency.aspx? 
storyid=46462#ixzz16fLrAGh3 (reporting Warren’s response to an interview question 
about the first steps the Bureau will take: “The first two initiatives are centered around 
credit cards and home mortgages.  I’ve already met with CEOs of the major credit-card 
issuers and other financial-services companies and with consumer groups on the 
readability of credit disclosures.”);; Rebecca Christie & Carter Dougherty, Treasury Aide 
Says Consumer Bureau Job Likely Filled by July, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 18, 2010), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-18/treasury-aide-says-consumer-bureau-job-
likely-filled-by-july.html (“[Treasury Department’s general counsel George Madison] said 
the consumer bureau probably would start by focusing on consumer banking products 
before adding in oversight of payday lenders and other financial firms not traditionally 
monitored by bank regulators.”). 
 125 Hilary B. Miller, The Future of the Payday Loan Industry Revisited Again—An 
Expert Opinion, PAYDAY LOAN INDUSTRY BLOG (July 28, 2010), 
http://paydayloanindustryblog.com/the-future-of-the-payday-loan-industry-revisited-
again-an-expert-opinion/ (“The industry’s antagonists have pronounced that the [Bureau 
of Consumer Financial Protection’s (BCFP)] . . . first act will be to regulate payday 
lenders out of business (even though payday lending was entirely unrelated to the causes 
of the recent financial crisis, they assume that the BCFP will have no bigger fish to fry 
than payday lending).  Some of my colleagues believe that payday lending is ‘low-hanging 
fruit’ that the BCFP can use to put up a quick and easy ‘W’ on the scorecard and, in the 
process, placate consumer groups.”). 
 126 Researcher Tackles Payday Loan Industry, GUELPHMERCURY (Jan. 19, 2010), 
http://www.guelphmercury.com/news/article/467344--researcher-tackles-payday-loan-
industry. 
 127 Ylan Q. Mui, Storefront Operations Argue for Exclusion from Financial Bill; 
Lawmakers Hear from Payday-Lending and Check-Cashing Firms, WASH. POST, May 10, 
2010, at A4 (“The industry also faces a renewed fight on payday lending.  Consumer 
groups have long criticized the practice for charging triple-digit interest rates and accused 
lenders of preying on low-income customers.  The nonprofit Center for Responsible 
Lending worked with North Carolina Sen. Kay Hagan (D) to introduce an amendment to 
the financial reform bill last week that would limit the number of payday loans consumers 
can take out to six per year and require lenders to give customers more time to repay the 
loan if needed.  In addition, the amendment would give the Federal Reserve the authority 
to license payday lenders.”). 
 128 Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 55–
56 (2008). 
 129 See Sanner, supra note 123 (quoting Warren as saying: “[A] model that is designed 
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power to eliminate rollovers.130  The Bureau could argue that 
rollovers are expensive for individual payday lending 
customers131 and could use evidence that rollovers are common to 
establish that many consumers are affected by the practice.132  
Many people claim that consumers do not anticipate rolling over 
their loans when they take them out, suggesting a market 
failure,133 which implies consumers could not reasonably avoid 
the injury. 
What effect would banning rollovers or limiting the number 
of rollovers have on the industry?  It might significantly decrease 
the number of companies willing to make short term loans.  The 
cost of originated two week loans is high, and rollovers are an 
important component to payday lenders’ profit models.134  It is 
possible that a complete ban on rollovers could cripple the 
industry. 
One industry attorney, Hilary Miller, is tentatively skeptical 
that the Bureau could take action against payday loans under 
either the unfairness or deceptive prongs of the Act.135  Because 
the FTC already has had the authority to prevent unfair and 
deceptive acts but has never found payday lending to fall within 
these categories, Miller argues that the Bureau cannot use these 
prongs against the industry: “To my mind, this argument entirely 
disposes of two of the three ‘bad conduct’ badges in the 
Act . . . . The FTC Act and Title X of Dodd-Frank are manifestly 
in pari materia, and chaos would result if they were interpreted 
differently.”136 
 
to keep those families in a revolving door of debt is not good for families—and ultimately 
not good for the economy.”). 
 130 Machetta, supra note 39 (“Whiel [sic] the bureau does not have the authority to 
cap interest rates, as some states have done, she says they do have the power to regulate 
other aspects of payday lending, such as limiting the number of loans.  [Brenda Procter of 
the University of Missouri, a payday loan expert,] believes this is the first step in leveling 
the playing field between consumers and lenders.”). 
 131 See Payday Loans Tempting, But Not Good Deals, WIS. STATE J., Jan. 17, 2010, at 
C1 (giving the example of a “$200 two-week payday loan charging $38.36 in interest.  
Within 10 weeks, the interest totals $191.78.”). 
 132 See infra notes 239–240 and accompanying text. 
 133 See infra notes 241–246 and accompanying text. 
 134 Mark Flannery & Katherine Samolyk, Payday Lending: Do the Costs Justify the 
Price?, (FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 2005-09, 2005). 
 135 Miller, supra note 125. 
 136 Id.  See also Carey Alexander, Note, Abusive: Dodd-Frank Section 1301 and the 
Continuing Struggle to Protect Consumers, ST. JOHN’S L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) 
(manuscript at 13), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1719600 (citing Capital Traction 
Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 36 (1899) and Carolene Prods. Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 26 
(1944) for the proposition that “[w]henever Congress adopts language with a ‘known and 
settled construction,’ it is presumed to adopt the previous judicial interpretations 
surrounding the language.”). 
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The problem with the argument, however, is that the FTC 
has never affirmatively found payday lending to be fair or not 
deceptive.  It just has not taken action either way.  It is possible 
to read this as an affirmation of the industry, but it is more likely 
that the FTC has never acted because it does not have infinite 
resources.  As Jeff Sovern has argued, the FTC lacks the 
resources to bring even cases it considers worthwhile.137  Thus, 
the Bureau could rule that rollovers or some other aspect of a 
fringe credit transaction are unfair despite the fact the FTC has 
never pursued a suit against this conduct on the theory that the 
FTC’s past actions just reflect scarce resources, not a judgment 
about all consumer credit practices that currently exist in the 
market.  Moreover, because the Bureau was created out of a 
sense that other agencies were not actually protecting 
consumers,138 it is likely the Bureau will take a more aggressive 
stance than the FTC on many issues.  Also, the Bureau will have 
a much easier time promulgating rules than the FTC.  The FTC 
has a burdensome rulemaking procedure139 compared to the 
Bureau’s procedure, which is relatively straightforward.  For 
instance, from 1980 to 2000, the FTC did not create a single rule 
related to unfair acts or practices.140  This difference may result 
in the Bureau having an easier time creating rules for fringe 
creditors.  Finally, the language defining unfairness in the FTC 
Act is not exactly the same as the language in the Dodd-Frank 
Act, suggesting the Bureau has a new chance to define 
unfairness.141 
 
 137 See Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act: 
Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 441–42 (1991) (“One 
practical limit restraining FTC abuses is, of course, politics.  FTC commissioners are 
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for terms of seven years.  While 
commissioners may be removed only for ‘inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in 
office,’ thus insulating commissioners to some extent from political considerations, it is 
inevitable that at least some commissioners will remain sensitive to the winds of political 
life . . .  A second practical limit to FTC excess is scarce resources.  The FTC budget is less 
than 55 million dollars, which is obviously a small sum for regulating the many 
transactions and businesses within the FTC's purview.  Because the FTC lacks the staff 
to pursue many significant improprieties, it is unlikely to expend its scarce resources on 
trivial deceptions.”). 
 138 Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Agency (The Pew Financial 
Reform Project, Briefing Paper No. 3, 2009), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/ 
Levitin%20-%20Consumer%20Financial%20Protection%20Agency.pdf. 
 139 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b).  See Mark E. Budnitz, The FTC’s Consumer Protection 
Program During the Miller Years: Lessons for Administrative Agency Structure and 
Operation, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 371, 417 (1997) (“[T]he Improvements Act of 1980 imposed 
stringent procedural requirements relating to the FTC’s rulemaking procedures.”). 
 140 Calkins, supra note 108, at 1960. 
 141 Alexander, supra note 136, at 13 (“Had Congress codified the House language 
expressly adopting the FTC’s policy statements, the CFPB’s powers to prohibit unfair and 
deceptive acts would be known and settled;; they would be the same as the FTC’s under 
the FTC Act.  Instead, because Congress effectively rejected the FTC’s definitions, the 
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ii.  Deceptive Acts or Practices 
The second prong of rulemaking power for the Bureau—
deception—is also in the FTC Act.  In general, the FTC produces 
rules to make it easy to find particular actions deceptive.142  “A 
representation or omission is deceptive if the overall net 
impression created is likely to mislead consumers.”143  The 
business’ intent is unimportant,144 and the act does not actually 
have to deceive anyone—it is enough that the act is likely to 
deceive someone,145 and that the representation is material.146  
Usually, deception cases relate to advertising claims,147 and the 
FTC has provided a non-exhaustive list of misleading or 
deceptive practices: 
[F]alse oral or written representations, misleading price claims, sales 
of hazardous or systematically defective products or services without 
adequate disclosures, failure to disclose information regarding 
pyramid sales, use of bait and switch techniques, failure to perform 
promised services, and failure to meet warranty obligations.148 
Federal Trade Comm’n v. Pharmtech Research, Inc. provides 
an example of the FTC’s understanding of the term deceptive.149  
In Pharmtech, the court granted a preliminary injunction 
preventing a business from continuing to advertise its dietary 
supplement.150  The business sold pills made of dehydrated and 
compressed vegetables and claimed that taking the pills reduced 
the risk of certain cancers because a study found that “frequent 
consumption of certain fruits and vegetables is associated with a 
reduction in the incidence of cancer in human beings, and found 
that carotene-rich vegetables, such as carrots, and cruciferous 
vegetables, such as broccoli, cabbage and Brussels sprouts, 
provide this benefit.”151  The business’ advertisements were 
 
CFPB may have a freer hand to define its ability to reach unfair and deceptive practices 
under Dodd-Frank.”). 
 142 Sovern, supra note 137, at 444. 
 143 Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, 74 Fed. Reg. 5498, 5504 (Jan. 29, 2009). 
 144 FTC v. Bay Area Bus. Council, Inc., 423 F.3d 627, 635 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 145 In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 app. at 4 (1984) [hereinafter FTC 
Policy Statement on Deception] (Appendix titled “FTC Policy Statement on Deception”). 
 146 Id. at 15–16. 
 147 FTC v. IFC Credit Corp., 543 F. Supp. 2d 925, 941 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (observing that 
deception cases “usually involve advertisements made by the defendant to induce 
consumers into purchasing the defendant’s products or services” and giving as examples 
FTC v. Bay Area Bus. Council, Inc., 423 F.3d 627, 635 (7th Cir. 2005), which found that 
“defendants misled consumers with bad credit into believing they were buying credit 
cards when in fact they were buying worthless ‘ChexCards,’” and F.T.C. v. World Travel 
Vacation Brokers, Inc., 861 F.2d 1020, 1029 (7th Cir. 1988), which found that “defendants 
misrepresented the cost of vacation packages to Hawaii”). 
 148 FTC Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 145, at 2–3. 
 149 FTC v. Pharmtech Research, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 294 (D.D.C. 1983). 
 150 Id. at 296. 
 151 Id. at 297. 
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deceptive within the meaning of the FTC Act because “they 
convey a misleading impression.”152  They implied that the study 
found that vegetable pills could reduce the risk of cancer when 
the study did not explicitly find that; in fact, the study 
specifically expressed doubts about whether processed vegetables 
could have the same salutary effects as fresh ones.153 
The Bureau might use this prong of its rulemaking power to 
require new disclosures on fringe banking products.  For 
instance, the Bureau might require payday lenders to post 
information about how often borrowers rollover loans or how 
much an average loan costs a borrower in total, much like the 
requirement that credit card companies put information on credit 
card statements which discloses how long it would take to pay off 
the debt and how much money borrowers will spend in interest 
payments if they only make minimum monthly payments.154 
For the most part, such disclosure requirements will likely 
have little effect on fringe creditors.  As discussed in Part III.A.ii, 
fringe credit contracts are relatively straightforward.  Disclosure 
regimes are usually supported by mainstream fringe creditors, so 
such rules would probably not encounter significant opposition.  
However, some disclosure requirements may have unintended 
consequences.  For instance, some states require rent-to-own 
stores to disclose APRs on rented goods.  This requirement has 
resulted in rent-to-own firms exiting these states almost 
completely.155  Thus, even in promulgating disclosure 
requirements, the Bureau may exercise its new power in a way to 
significantly limit the availability of alternative financial services 
to consumers. 
iii.  Abusive Acts or Practices 
Few federal agencies have powers related to abusive acts or 
practices, so we have the least guidance when predicting what 
sorts of rules the Bureau may promulgate pursuant to this 
power.156  The examples in current statutes empowering agencies 
to regulate abusive contracts have either been basically unused 
or do not parallel the Bureau’s power.  For instance, the Federal 
Reserve has the power to find lending practices related to 
 
 152 Id. at 301. 
 153 Id. at 302. 
 154 15 U.S.C. § 1637(b)(11) (2006). 
 155 See Hawkins, supra note 50, at 2045. 
 156 Michael A. Benoit, The Birth of a New Financial Services Regulator, BUS. L. 
TODAY (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/blt/content/2010/11/article-
benoit.shtml (last visited Nov. 30, 2010) (“While we have years of jurisprudence from 
which providers may glean what acts or practices may be unfair or deceptive, the 
standard for ‘abusive’ practices is new and untested.”). 
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mortgage financing abusive.157  The Federal Reserve, however, 
rarely exercises that power, leaving us with little understanding 
of the term.158  Also, the FTC has the power to regulate abusive 
telemarketing acts or practices,159 and it has promulgated 
regulations under this statute, but the regulations do not provide 
a meaningful parallel to the Bureau’s power.  The term “abusive” 
is not defined in the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and 
Abuse Prevention statute,160 but the statute and regulations give 
examples of abusive acts,161 and courts have deemed some 
conduct abusive under the statute.162  Unfortunately, however, 
very little of the FTC’s power in this area relates to credit,163 so it 
is difficult to extrapolate what abusive means from the 
regulations in this statute. 
This lack of current precedent has caused some observers to 
worry that the Bureau will have vast power to curtail consumer 
lending products.  One recent article in the American Banker, for 
instance, quotes, among other concerned parties, the president of 
the Consumer Bankers Association, a partner with Morrison & 
Foerster LLP, a partner at Covington & Burling LLP, and a 
partner at Goodwin Procter saying that the power to create rules 
under the abusive standard is “egregious,” allows the Bureau to 
 
 157 15 U.S.C. § 1639(l)(2)(B) (2006). 
 158 Alexander, supra note 136, at 19–20 (“The Fed hesitantly declared only two 
practices as abusive: loan flipping and equity stripping . . . .  The Fed’s findings suggest 
that two threads run through both practices: consumer action is induced by a potential 
benefit that is suppose to run to him, and the action taken causes either no benefit or a 
detriment of the consumer.  Such a definition was far too restrictive to carry out the Fed’s 
mandate to address abusive practices.  If anything, it serves as an example of a narrow 
definition that the CFPB should avoid.”). 
 159 15 U.S.C. § 6102(a)(1) (2006) (“The Commission shall prescribe rules prohibiting 
deceptive telemarketing acts or practices and other abusive telemarketing acts or 
practices.”). 
 160 15 U.S.C. § 6106 (2006). 
 161 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(1) (2010) (outlawing “[t]hreats, intimidation, or the use of 
profane or obscene language”);; 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(c) (2010) (“Calling time restrictions. 
Without the prior consent of a person, it is an abusive telemarketing act or practice and a 
violation of this Rule for a telemarketer to engage in outbound telephone calls to a 
person's residence at any time other than between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m. local time at 
the called person's location.”). 
 162 FTC v. MacGregor, 360 F. App’x 891, 894–95 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that high 
volume of consumer complaints, high refund and return rates, and the number of 
investigations by state Attorney General was enough for the court to hold that there was 
a practice of engaging in abusive conduct); The Broadcast Team, Inc. v. FTC., 429 F. 
Supp. 2d 1292 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (finding for-profit “telefunders” utilizing prerecorded calls 
to solicit funds on behalf of non-profit charities is abusive). 
 163 The only regulation related to initiating credit relationships (and not debt 
settlement) is in section 310.4(a)(4) which states that it is abusive to “[r]equest[] or 
receive[] payment of any fee or consideration in advance of obtaining a loan or other 
extension of credit when the seller or telemarketer has guaranteed or represented a high 
likelihood of success in obtaining or arranging a loan or other extension of credit for a 
person.” 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(4). 
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pass any rule because the standard is “whatever the bureau 
director says it is,” and is likely impossible for businesses to 
comply with because “the term is so broad and the definition is so 
broad” and the standard is “very subjective.”164 
The language of the statute, however, suggests that the 
standard for abusive acts is, for the most part, very similar to the 
standard for deceptive acts and unfair acts.165  Several of the 
bases the Bureau can use to determine an act is abusive relate to 
a consumer being deceived and misunderstanding a transaction: 
An act is abusive if it “materially interferes with the ability of a 
consumer to understand” or unreasonably takes advantage of a 
consumer’s lack of understanding of the material risks, costs, or 
conditions of the product or service.166  Indeed, the requirements 
that the act “materially” interfere with the consumer’s ability to 
understand the transaction and that the consumer 
misunderstand the “material” risks of the product incorporate 
the court-created requirement that the deceptive act must be 
material to the transaction.167 
Similarly, the ability to declare an act abusive if the 
consumer cannot protect herself from harm contains almost the 
same language as the definition of an unfair act.168  The major 
difference is that this part of the standard for abusive conduct 
does not require a “substantial injury” to the consumer, 
potentially opening up new rulemaking for acts that cause 
insubstantial injury.  The standard does, however, require that 
the transaction unreasonably take advantage of the consumer 
who cannot protect herself, so the Bureau cannot declare all such 
acts abusive.  Considering the fact the Bureau will not likely 
concern itself with acts that cause little harm, it is not clear that 
 
 164 Cheyenne Hopkins, New ‘Abusive’ Standard in Dodd-Frank Has Bankers Nervous, 
AM. BANKER, Nov. 23, 2010, available at http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/175_225/ 
dodd-frank-abusive-1028984-1.html. 
 165 In contrast to my view here, Carey Alexander suggests the fact that “abusive” was 
added to “unfair and deceptive” means that they necessarily mean different things. See 
Alexander, supra note 136, at 4 (“Unfairness and deception have well-established 
meanings, and their inclusion alongside ‘abusive’ suggests that the new doctrine 
represents something unique and apart from the old doctrines.”). 
 166 Dodd-Frank § 1031(d). 
 167 FTC Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 145, at 4. 
 168 Compare Dodd-Frank § 1031(c)(1) (stating the Bureau can only declare an act 
unfair if “the Bureau has a reasonable basis to conclude that . . . the act or practice causes 
or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by 
consumers . . . and such substantial injury is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to 
consumers or to competition”), with Dodd-Frank § 1031(d)(2)(B) (stating that the Bureau 
can define an act as abusive if it “takes unreasonable advantage of . . . the inability of the 
consumer to protect the interests of the consumer in selecting or using a consumer 
financial product or service”). 
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the ability to declare acts abusive without substantial injury 
really gives the Bureau any new authority. 
The only truly new part of the standard is the Bureau’s 
ability to declare an act abusive if it “takes unreasonable 
advantage of . . . the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a 
covered person to act in the interests of the consumer.”169  One 
commentator has suggested that businesses will be able to 
protect themselves from problems under this part of the standard 
by disclosing to consumers that they should not rely on the 
business to protect their interests in the transaction.170  Such 
statements have been effective to negate reliance under state 
consumer protection laws.  In Texas, if a consumer signs a 
contract that states the consumer is purchasing a good or 
property “as is” and without reliance on the seller’s 
representations, the consumer cannot claim that she relied on 
the seller’s representations.171  The Texas Supreme Court 
explained in a seminal case that: 
[The plaintiff’s] ‘as is’ agreement negates his claim that any action by 
Prudential caused his injury.  His contractual disavowal of reliance 
upon any representation by Prudential was an important element of 
their arm’s-length transaction and is binding on Goldman unless set 
aside.  The ‘as is’ agreement negates causation essential to recovery 
on all theories Goldman asserts . . . .172 
Thus, it is possible through effective disclosure that 
businesses will be able to avoid liability under this part of the 
abusive standard. 
The fact that this prong requires the consumer’s reliance be 
reasonable seems to again incorporate deception into this prong.  
In most commercial relationships, all parties assume that the 
other negotiates in such a way as to obtain the maximum benefit 
for itself under the transaction.173  Thus, to create a situation in 
which a consumer reasonably relies on the business to act in the 
consumer’s interest would seem to require that the business 
 
 169 Dodd-Frank § 1031(d)(2)(C).  See Benoit, supra note 156 (“There is, however, a 
new twist to this standard that has not been seen before.  That is, this ‘abusive’ standard 
includes a fiduciary element unprecedented in the consumer lending industry, i.e., taking 
unreasonable advantage of the ‘reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered person 
to act in the consumer’s interests.’”). 
 170 Benoit, supra note 156. 
 171 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.42 (West 2009). 
 172 Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson Assocs. Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex. 
1995).  See also Larsen v. Carlene Langford & Assocs., 41 S.W.3d 245, 255 (Tex. App. 
2001) (holding that an “as is” clause in a contract illustrated that the consumer did not 
rely on the seller’s representations). 
 173 See e.g., U.C.C. § 1-304 (2007) (requiring parties to use good faith in performing 
and enforcing contracts but not in negotiating them). 
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falsely communicate to the consumer that it will act in the 
consumer’s interest. 
Despite my analysis that the abusive power seems largely 
repetitive of the unfair and deceptive powers, the Bureau may 
construe the word very differently, as others have urged it to 
do.174  As with the unfairness prong, the abusive prong of the 
Bureau’s rule-making power enables it to potentially intervene 
into fringe credit markets in substantial, innovative ways. 
D. Enforcement 
Fringe banking firms will also likely be affected by enhanced 
enforcement of existing federal consumer protection laws.  As 
Part III.D explains, current federal consumer law constrains 
fringe banking transactions.  The Act increases the likelihood 
fringe lenders will pay penalties for violating these laws as well 
as any rules the Bureau creates because it gives the Bureau 
significant enforcement powers. 
Under the Act, the Bureau can demand material and 
testimony if it suspects a violation of federal consumer protection 
law,175 it can issue cease and desist orders,176 and it can 
commence litigation against violators.177  Although it cannot seek 
exemplary or punitive damages,178 it can seek a variety of 
remedies, including rescission or reformation of contracts, 
restitution, payment of damages or other monetary relief, civil 
penalties, and the costs of pursuing the violator.179  The civil 
penalties are severe.  For violations without recklessness, “a civil 
penalty may not exceed $5,000 for each day during which such 
violation or failure to pay continues,” but “for any person that 
recklessly engages in a violation of a Federal consumer financial 
law, a civil penalty may not exceed $25,000 for each day during 
which such violation continues.”180  If the person knowingly 
violates the law, “a civil penalty may not exceed $1,000,000 for 
each day during which such violation continues.”181 
Perhaps even more threatening to fringe lenders is the 
increase in information the Bureau will have about businesses 
 
 174 Alexander, supra note 136, at 20 (“Congress’s enactment of a flexible definition of 
abusive, coupled with Congress’s clear dissatisfaction with the Fed’s narrow 
interpretation of its powers to reach abusive practices suggests that the CFPB should 
adopt a broad, expansive interpretation of its powers to address abusive practices.”). 
 175 Dodd-Frank § 1052. 
 176 Dodd-Frank § 1053(b). 
 177 Dodd-Frank § 1054(a). 
 178 Dodd-Frank § 1055(a)(3). 
 179 Dodd-Frank § 1055(a)(2)&(b). 
 180 Dodd-Frank § 1055(c)(2). 
 181 Id. 
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violating federal consumer protection law.  A primary function of 
the Bureau is “collecting, investigating, and responding to 
consumer complaints.”182  One mechanism the Bureau will have 
for learning about violations is a consumer hotline for complaints 
established by the Act.183  In her work establishing the Bureau, 
Warren has pledged to use new technologies, such as 
crowdsourcing,184 to enhance the amount of information that the 
Bureau gathers from consumers.185  After gathering this 
information, the Bureau will establish procedures to “provide a 
timely response to consumers . . . to complaints against . . . a 
covered person . . . .”186  Both the powers to gather information 
and to act on that information give the Bureau the power to take 
definite action to affect fringe lenders who violate federal rules 
and statutes. 
E. The Act’s Relation to State Law 
New federal laws and rules governing the fringe economy 
add to an extensive, diverse array of existing state law.  In light 
of the fact that most fringe banking regulations currently are 
based in state law, this section analyzes the relationship the Act 
has to that important body of law and demonstrates that the 
 
 182 Dodd-Frank § 1021(c)(2). 
 183 Dodd-Frank § 1013(b)(3)(A). 
 184 Crowdsourcing is “the act of a company or institution taking a function once 
performed by employees and outsourcing it to an undefined (and generally large) network 
of people in the form of an open call.” Jeff P. Howe, Crowdsourcing: A Definition, 
CROWDSOURCING (June 2, 2006, 10:30 AM), http://crowdsourcing.typepad.com/cs/2006/06/ 
crowdsourcing_a.html.  This alternative model of peer production allows for “companies to 
engage with and harness the crowd for help.” John Winsor, Crowdsourcing: What It 
Means for Innovation, BUS. WEEK, June 15, 2009, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/innovate/content/jun2009/id20090615_946326.htm; Daryl 
Lim, Beyond Microsoft: Intellectual Property, Peer Production and the Law’s Concern with 
Market Dominance, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 291, 301–04 (2008). 
 185 Eileen Ambrose, Elizabeth Warren: Three Top Goals for New Consumer Protection 
Agency, CONSUMING INTERESTS (Nov. 10, 2010, 2:22 PM), 
http://weblogs.baltimoresun.com/business/consuminginterests/blog/2010/11/elizabeth_war
ren_three_top_goa.html (noting that one of Warren’s top three priorities of the Bureau is 
“using technology to tap into the experience of millions of consumers so the bureau can 
develop a rapid response to problems”);; Bill Swindell, Warren Outlines Sweeping New 
Approach to Consumer Financial Protection, NATIONAL J. (Oct. 26, 2010), 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/daily/warren-outlines-sweeping-new-financial-protection-
approach-20101026 (“In an interview on Tuesday with National Journal, Warren said 
new techniques like crowd-sourcing—scaled-up variations on Wikipedia—make it possible 
to collect valuable information from millions of ordinary consumers who report problems 
as they arise.  Using new systems to organize and find patterns in all that information, 
Warren said, the bureau could be able to spot new enforcement targets in a matter of 
days—an unheard-of response time for traditional regulators . . . .  Under her vision, 
Warren imagines a subset of Americans reporting on a specific problem, such as 
extraneous fine print included in a bank’s checking account statement, documenting it 
through use of a camera phone, and then emailing it to the bureau within seconds.  The 
bureau would use such data to target its enforcement.”). 
 186 Dodd-Frank § 1034(a). 
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Bureau will only add regulations to fringe credit markets, not 
take any away. 
i.  The Effect of Existing State Laws on Rulemaking 
Several provisions in the Act suggest that the Bureau will be 
less involved in regulating industries that are already covered by 
extensive state regulation.187  For instance, in determining how 
to supervise nondepository firms like fringe bankers, the Bureau 
will consider “the extent to which such institutions are subject to 
oversight by State authorities for consumer protection.”188  
Presumably, if transactions are heavily regulated by states, the 
Bureau will be disinclined to promulgate additional rules. 
One problem the Bureau will encounter in following these 
provisions is the disparate approach states have taken to 
regulating fringe credit.  As just one example, some states 
outlaw, either explicitly or implicitly, title lending,189 while 
others permit it with virtually no restraints.190  Thus, it is not 
entirely clear whether title loans are “subject to oversight by 
State authorities” because it depends entirely on the state.  If the 
Bureau does not create rules on these sorts of transactions, then 
people in many states are left unprotected; if the Bureau does 
create rules, the rules may impose duplicative requirements on 
firms. 
ii.  Coordination 
The Act attempts to mitigate the effects of duplicative 
requirements on businesses by requiring the Bureau to 
coordinate with state regulators.  For instance, with the express 
goal of minimizing regulatory burden, the Bureau must 
coordinate its supervisory activities with state regulators, 
“including establishing their respective schedules for examining 
 
 187 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank § 1022(b)(3) (instructing the Bureau to consider the extent of 
state regulation when determining if an industry should be exempt from its rules). 
 188 Dodd-Frank § 1024(b)(2)(D). 
 189 For an example of a state explicitly banning title lending, see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 37:1801(D) (2010).  For an example of states that effectively ban title lending by capping 
interest rates at a level that prevents firms from operating in the state, see COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 5-2-201(2) (2010) (capping loans under $1000 at 36% APR); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, 
§ 41a(4) (2010) (capping loans secured by vehicles at 20% APR). 
 190 For instance, New Mexico sanctions small dollar loans and does not place a cap on 
the interest lenders can charge either in the small loan statute or general state law. See 
generally N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-15-17 (2010).  Section 56-8-3 sets out that interest rates in 
the state generally “in the absence of a written contract fixing a different rate, shall be 
not more than fifteen percent annually,” but it does not prevent the parties agreeing in a 
written contract to a higher interest rate. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-8-3 (2010).  The end result 
is that title lenders have restrictions on the interest rate they can charge, and title 
borrowers have no specific protections beyond those afforded to borrowers generally in the 
Uniform Commercial Code. 
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persons . . . and requirements regarding reports to be submitted 
by such persons.”191  Additionally, in setting capital requirements 
for supervised nondepositories “the Bureau shall consult with 
State agencies regarding requirements or systems (including 
coordinated or combined systems for registration), where 
appropriate.”192  Finally, the Act mandates that the Bureau 
coordinate with states when setting up registration requirements 
for all business it monitors.193  To the extent this coordination is 
successful, it will obviously reduce demands on fringe banking 
firms, but it is again questionable how the Bureau will be able to 
coordinate with states that have different requirements.  While it 
might be simple to harmonize the federal requirements with a 
single state, it seems impossible to do so with several states that 
have different registration requirements, for example. 
iii.  Powers Given to State Governments 
The Act actually confers some powers on state regulators.  
First, states can prompt the Bureau to consider proposing a rule 
if a majority of states enact a resolution supporting a rule.194  
Second, in addition to clarifying that states still have the 
authority to enforce their own consumer protection laws,195 the 
Act empowers states to file suits in consultation with the 
Bureau196 to enforce Bureau regulations,197 except against 
national banks and federal savings associations.198  These 
provisions should increase the potential that fringe banking 
businesses will face enforcement actions of the Bureau’s rules—
even beyond the augmentation of general enforcement powers 
 
 191 Dodd-Frank § 1024(b)(3). 
 192 Dodd-Frank § 1024(b)(7)(D). 
 193 Dodd-Frank § 1022(c)(7)(C). 
 194 Dodd-Frank § 1041(c)(1) (“The Bureau shall issue a notice of proposed rulemaking 
whenever a majority of the States has enacted a resolution in support of the 
establishment or modification of a consumer protection regulation by the Bureau.”). 
 195 Dodd-Frank § 1042(d)(1). 
 196 Dodd-Frank § 1042(b). 
 197 Dodd-Frank § 1042(a)(1) (“[T]he attorney general (or the equivalent thereof) of any 
State may bring a civil action . . . to enforce provisions of this title or regulations issued 
under this title, and to secure remedies under provisions of this title or remedies 
otherwise provided under other law.  A State regulator may bring a civil action or other 
appropriate proceeding to enforce the provisions of this title or regulations issued under 
this title with respect to any entity that is State-chartered, incorporated, licensed, or 
otherwise authorized to do business under State law . . . and to secure remedies under 
provisions of this title or remedies otherwise provided under other provisions of law with 
respect to such an entity.”).  States are limited from enforcing the Bureau’s rules against 
exempt merchants, just as the Bureau cannot enforce those rules. Dodd-Frank 
§ 1027(a)(2)(E) (“To the extent that the Bureau may not exercise authority under this 
subsection with respect to a merchant, retailer, or seller of nonfinancial goods or services, 
no action by a State attorney general or State regulator with respect to a claim made 
under this title may be brought under subsection 1042(a) . . . .”). 
 198 Dodd-Frank § 1042(a)(2). 
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discussed above—because state attorneys general will have a 
new tool to combat what they perceive to be sharp practices. 
iv.  Preemption 
The Act specifies that it does not relieve lenders from 
complying with applicable state laws.  The statute asserts that 
state laws remain in effect “except to the extent that any such 
provision of law is inconsistent with the provisions of this 
title.”199  State laws are not inconsistent with the Act if “the 
protection that such statute, regulation, order, or interpretation 
affords to consumers is greater than the protection provided 
under this title.”200 
Several federal statutes contain language that is similar to 
the Act’s language permitting states to offer consumers greater 
protections.201  In discussing these statutes, courts have used the 
requirement that states provide greater consumer protection to 
be a one-way ratchet to enforce state laws that offer heightened 
restrictions on businesses’ conduct; only laws that further restrict 
businesses are said to offer consumers greater protection.202 
Having a federal law that regulates fringe banking but does 
not preempt state law is the worst-case scenario for fringe 
lenders because it involves an expansion of regulatory control 
over their activities.  Many people in the fringe banking industry 
have pushed for federal laws, but their purpose in doing so is to 
prevent less favorable state laws from limiting their activities.  
For example, the rent-to-own industry trade association has 
 
 199 Dodd-Frank § 1041(a)(1). 
 200 Dodd-Frank § 1041(a)(2). 
 201 See 12 U.S.C. § 2616 (2006) (“The Secretary may not determine that any State law 
is inconsistent with any provision of this chapter if the Secretary determines that such 
law gives greater protection to the consumer.”);; 15 U.S.C. § 1692n (2006) (“For purposes of 
this section, a State law is not inconsistent with this subchapter if the protection such law 
affords any consumer is greater than the protection provided by this subchapter.”);; 
15 U.S.C. § 1691d(f) (2006) (“The Board may not determine that any State law is 
inconsistent with any provision of this subchapter if the Board determines that such law 
gives greater protection to the applicant.”);; 12 U.S.C. § 2805(a) (2006) (“The Board may 
not determine that any such law is inconsistent with any provision of this chapter if the 
Board determines that such law requires the maintenance of records with greater 
geographic or other detail than is required under this chapter, or that such law otherwise 
provides greater disclosure than is required under this chapter.”). 
 202 See Washington Mut. Bank, FA v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 4th 773, 783 
(1999) (approving of a state law that offers consumers remedies beyond those given in 
federal laws); Pirouzian v. SLM Corp., 396 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1131 (S.D. Cal. 2005) 
(holding a federal law does not preempt a state law if the state law expands the coverage 
of the law against additional businesses); Sibley v. Firstcollect, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 469, 473 
(M.D. La. 1995) (approving of a state law that prohibits additional conduct beyond that 
prohibited by federal laws); Desmond v. Phillips & Cohen Assocs., Ltd., 724 F. Supp. 2d 
562, 567–68 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (upholding a state law that furthered the goals of a federal 
law). 
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supported a federal law on rent-to-own called the Consumer 
Rental Purchase Agreement Act.203  This law sets out a variety of 
rules for rent-to-own and even includes similar language to the 
Consumer Financial Protection Act regarding state laws that 
provide greater protection for consumers.204  But, the bill clarifies 
that no state law can regulate rent-to-own as a credit sale or 
require businesses to disclose interest rates.205  These two rules 
have historically been of overwhelming importance to rent-to-
own companies,206 so the passage of the bill would be a major 
victory because it would prevent states from enacting these 
disfavored regulations.  The new Consumer Financial Protection 
Act as written, however, does not bring this benefit, it only adds 
restrictions onto fringe lenders’ conduct.  As with the other 
substantive provisions on fringe banking, the sections discussing 
preemption reveal a profound new power the federal government 
now has to govern the fringe economy.  The next part asks a 
more basic question: Is this power justified? 
III.  THE RATIONALES BEHIND THE BUREAU REGULATING  
FRINGE BANKING 
As the previous two parts have indicated, it is difficult to 
predict what the Bureau will do when it begins promulgating 
rules and enforcing federal consumer protection laws.  And, even 
if we knew exactly what it intended to do, it is impossible to 
understand all of the effects of the Bureau’s conduct before those 
effects play out.  Thus, the primary way to assess the Bureau’s 
import before it begins significantly intervening in the fringe 
economy is to assess the rationales for the Bureau.  As David 
Skeel points out: 
We can’t really know in advance whether these costs will materialize, 
of course.  Moreover, the answer will depend on how the Consumer 
Bureau pursues its regulatory mandate, which will be different at 
different times in the Bureau’s life.  For now, the chief question is 
simply whether the new consumer champion is justified.207 
This part takes up that inquiry. 
 
 203 Association of Progressive Rental Organizations, RTO Legislative Activity—Why 
the Rent-to-Own Industry is Seeking Federal Legislation, RTOHQ.COM, 
http://www.rtohq.org/apro-seeking-the-support-of-congress.html (last visited Mar. 22, 
2011); Consumer Rental-Purchase Agreement Act of 2009, S. 738, 111th Cong. (2009) 
[hereinafter Consumer Rental Purchase Agreement Act] (the text of the bill as proposed 
by the Association of Progressive Rental Organizations is available at 
http://www.rtohq.org/pdfs/RTOBillText.pdf). 
 204 See Consumer Rental Purchase Agreement Act § 1018(a)(3). 
 205 Consumer Rental Purchase Agreement Act § 1018(b). 
 206 See Hawkins, supra note 50, at 2101–09. 
 207 SKEEL, supra note 98, at 113. 
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In order to assess the rationales offered for the Bureau 
regulating fringe credit, it is important to group different 
rationales into categories.  This part categorizes the diverse 
reasons that popular press, government officials, and academics 
have proffered to justify the Bureau’s control over fringe banking 
products.  To describe the rationales, I draw primarily on two of 
Elizabeth Warren’s articles proposing the Bureau.208  Although 
these two articles are not the only academic works advocating for 
the Bureau, they are significant because the President appointed 
Warren as a special advisor to oversee the creation of the 
Bureau209 and these two articles are widely considered the 
academic work that propelled the Bureau into existence.210 
To understand how prominent and significant these 
justifications were in public statements about the Bureau and its 
relationship to fringe banking, three research assistants and I 
read virtually every article that mentioned both the Bureau and 
fringe banking that was found in LexisNexis’ “News, All” source 
from January 2007, before the Bureau was proposed, to May 21, 
2010, the day the President signed the Act into law.211  This 
source draws from more than 4650 news outlets across the 
United States and a variety of countries.  The search terms we 
entered generated 1520 results, and we reviewed 1496 of those 
results.212 
We assessed and coded each result to record: (1) the nature 
of the source (news article, editorial, or government publication); 
 
 208 Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY, Summer 2007, at 1; Bar-Gill 
& Warren, supra note 128. 
 209 Warren’s Appointment Rankles GOP, CREDIT UNION J., Sep. 27, 2010, at 39. 
 210 See SKEEL, supra note 98, at 50–51, 100 (“The agency had been conceived by 
Harvard law professor and TARP Oversight Committee head Elizabeth Warren, first in a 
short 2007 article whose title—“Unsafe at Any Rate”—consciously linked her to the Ralph 
Nader crusades of the 1960s, and then a more detailed, co-authored article a year 
later . . . .  With a few exceptions, the legislative blueprint for the new Consumer Bureau 
reads as if it came straight from these two articles, as in many respects it did.”);; Michael 
Tomasky, The Elizabeth Warren Story, GUARDIAN (July 20, 2010, 21:05 BST), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/michaeltomasky/2010/jul/20/obama-
administration-finreg-consumers-warren (describing Warren’s article in Democracy as the 
first call for an agency to oversee consumer financial protection). 
 211 We ran the following search: “(fringe-bank! or fringe-financial-service or 
alternative-financial-service or nonbank-lend! or payday-l! or pawn! or rent-to-own or 
title-l! or refund-anticipation-loans) and ((consumer-financial-protection w/3 bureau) or 
(consumer-financial-protection-agency.)”. 
 212 I say we read virtually every article that appeared in this database because during 
the time we performed the study (September 2010–November 2010), the number of 
results from the search jumped from 1520 to 1560 as additional articles were added.  This 
change in the number of results combined with the fact multiple people were working on 
different sections of the result led to twenty-four results being coded twice and twenty-
four not being coded at all.  I eliminated the twenty-four results that were coded twice 
from the database because it only represented 1.5% of the total results.  In the end, we 
reviewed 1496 stories instead of the 1520 that were originally generated by the search. 
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(2) the extent of the coverage (provides no coverage, merely 
mentions the Bureau and fringe banking, merely explains the 
law, or offers justifications for the Bureau regulating fringe 
banking); and (3) the justification, if any, offered for the Bureau 
governing fringe banking.  The coding information was imputed 
into a custom-designed Microsoft Excel database.  Each 
researcher underwent a training class and received detailed 
written coding protocols about how to code the results, and we 
met periodically to ensure we were uniformly carrying out the 
coding protocol.  I reviewed each researcher’s data to lessen the 
chance of a coding error. 
Of the 1496 results we reviewed, 897 were unique articles, 
and 599 of the results repeated an earlier article verbatim.  Of 
the 897 unique results, 539 were newspaper articles, 121 were 
newspaper editorials, and 237 were government documents.  The 
government documents consisted of press releases from 
Congressmen and women and transcripts of hearings. 
The majority of the results did not mention any arguments 
in favor of the Bureau regulating fringe banking.  Twenty-one of 
the results were false positives—they were not actually about the 
Bureau and fringe banking.  Five hundred ninety-eight of the 
results merely mentioned fringe banking and the Bureau or 
explained the Act, and thirty-eight of the results presented 
arguments against the Bureau regulating fringe banking.  The 
remaining 240 results offered arguments for the Bureau 
regulating fringe lenders, either directly in the case of press 
releases, testimony at hearings, and editorials, or indirectly by 
reporting the views of others.  For each result that coded a 
justification, the researcher pasted the text of the article related 
to the justification in a separate cell of the spreadsheet.  Table 1 
summarizes the results, which are discussed in more depth 
below: 
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TABLE 1 
 
Prominence of Justifications for the Bureau  
Regulating Fringe Banking 
 Percent of Articles 
Discussing This 
Justification 




Relies on Deception 19% 46 
Fringe Banking Is 





Fringe Banking Is 
Unregulated 49% 118 





In addition to describing the rationales offered for the 
Bureau’s power over fringe banking, this part evaluates whether 
these rationales can sensibly be applied to fringe credit products.  
Some of the justifications are plainly inapplicable to fringe 
banking transactions, while others accurately point out problems 
the Bureau could correct in fringe credit markets.  One goal of 
this part is to focus regulators’ attention on the real problems the 
Bureau could solve in fringe markets and urge the Bureau not to 
act to “fix” problems that evidence has not demonstrated exist in 
fringe credit industries. 
A. Deception 
A central focus of those justifying the Bureau has been the 
confusing and deceptive consumer credit contracts that 
borrowers face when borrowing money.  Warren has introduced a 
catchy phrase to sum up the problem, “tricks and traps,”214 that 
has been repeated over and over in the media.215  Our study of 
news sources regarding the creation of the Bureau found that 19 
 
 213 These numbers add up to more than 240 because some results had more than one 
justification in them. 
 214 See Warren, supra note 208, at 9 (“Lenders have deliberately built tricks and 
traps into some credit products so they can ensnare families in a cycle of high-cost debt.”). 
 215 For instance, a search for “(tricks w/3 traps) and consumer-financial-protection” in 
LexisNexis’ “News, All” source yielded 379 results on October 24, 2010. 
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percent (n=46) of the stories provided deception as a reason the 
Bureau should regulate fringe credit.216  Some of the sources 
noted that payday loan documents are “incomprehensible”217 and 
hide terms in fine print,218 while others simply stated the Bureau 
will be able to prevent deceptive payday loans.219  This section 
discusses the two ways supporters of the Bureau claim credit 
contracts are deceptive: the terms of the contracts themselves 
and the credit products’ designs. 
i.  Tricks and Traps in Contracts 
First, consumer credit contracts themselves came under fire 
from those seeking to establish the Bureau.  Warren’s first article 
proposing the Bureau emphasized how credit contracts have 
become extremely long and complicated in order to hide 
unfavorable terms: 
Part of the problem is that disclosure has become a way to obfuscate 
rather than to inform.  According to the Wall Street Journal, in the 
early 1980s, the typical credit card contract was a page long; by the 
early 2000s, that contract had grown to more than 30 pages of 
incomprehensible text.  The additional terms were not designed to 
make life easier for the customer.  Rather, they were designed in large 
part to add unexpected—and unreadable—terms that favor the card 
companies.  Mortgage-loan documents, payday-loan papers, car-loan 
terms, and other lending products are often equally 
incomprehensible.220 
The sheer length and complexity of the contract makes it 
prohibitively costly for borrowers to understand the terms of the 
transaction or compare different lenders’ terms.221 
Warren even uses a payday lending contract as an example 
of the sort of “devilishly complex financial undertakings” the 
 
 216 We determined a result used deception as a justification for the Bureau regulating 
fringe credit if the result discussed (1) consumers being tricked in any way by the fringe 
bankers or (2) consumers making poor decisions when evaluating fringe banking 
products. 
 217 Tomasky, supra note 210. 
 218 Ronald D. Orol, Why Washington Can’t Agree on Consumer Protection, 
MARKETWATCH (Mar. 4, 2010, 12:56 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/why-
washington-cant-agree-on-consumer-protection-2010-03-04 (“A consumer agency could 
cap the interest rate that pay-day lenders charge and require these companies to disclose 
their fee structure that is often hidden in the fine print.”). 
 219 See, e.g., Robert Weissman, Congress Passes Financial Reform, Consumer 
Protections; Much More Must Be Done to Rein in Wall Street, COMMONDREAMS.ORG (July 
15, 2010, 4:53 PM), http://www.commondreams.org/newswire/2010/07/15-22 (“This bureau 
will have the authority to crack down on unfair, deceptive and abusive practices in 
connection with consumer products such as payday loans, credit cards and mortgages by 
using new rules and enforcement powers.”). 
 220 Warren, supra note 208, at 11–12. 
 221 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 128, at 13–14. 
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Bureau would police.222  She claims that payday lenders hide “a 
staggering interest rate” in “the tangle of disclosures,” giving the 
example of one contract which only listed the interest rate in a 
page of disclosures and not on the fee page.223  In a subsequent 
article, Warren and her co-author, Oren Bar-Gill, point out that 
payday borrowers frequently know the finance charge for the 
loan but do not know the interest rate,224 presumably because it 
is hidden. 
To evaluate whether this rationale is a persuasive basis for 
the Bureau regulating the fringe economy, I collected contracts 
from several different fringe banking transactions.  Surveying 
the characteristics of these contracts casts serious doubt on the 
Bureau regulating fringe credit because of the opaque nature of 
its contracts. 
The first contract I evaluated was a rent-to-own contract 
used by a regional rent-to-own company headquartered in the Midwest.225  
Its rent-to-own agreement is two pages long, written in ten point 
font, and contains approximately 2000 words; 576 of those words 
relate to the mandatory arbitration clause.  All of the costs of the 
transaction are written in a separate box near the top of the first 
page of the contract.  There are several ways to evaluate the 
complexity of a writing, but under any of these standards, this 
contract seems basic.  Consider the following paragraph which is 
written in a similar manner as the rest of the contract: 
Reinstatement: If you fail to make a rental renewal payment by the 
renewal date, this Agreement terminates and we are entitled to the 
immediate return of our property.  To reinstate, you must return the 
property to us as soon as we ask you to.  Then, you can reinstate this 
agreement by making all payments due to us within 21 days of the 
renewal date if you pay weekly or within 90 days if you pay monthly.  
If you reinstate, we will provide you the same merchandise, or with 
substitute merchandise of comparable quality and conditions. 
The reader can judge whether this term is comprehensible, 
but it seems like a significant stretch to call this contract 
“incomprehensible text.” 
Similarly, Rent-A-Center, the nation’s largest rent-to-own 
company, has a contract that is two pages long, but unlike the first 
rent-to-own company’s contract, Rent-A-Center has a separate 
arbitration agreement in addition to these two pages.  Like the 
 
 222 Warren, supra note 208, at 10. 
 223 Id. at 13. 
 224 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 128, at 30. 
 225 In exchange for me using its contract, the company asked it not be identified in my 
paper. 
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other rental agreement I discussed, Rent-A-Center’s agreement 
discloses all costs on the first page of the contract and is written 
at a similar level of complexity.  Rent-A-Center is currently 
rewriting its rental agreement in New York because of recent 
changes in the law, and the General Counsel is explicitly 
attempting to write the contract at a seventh grade reading 
level.226 
In addition to rent-to-own contracts, I secured a pawnshop 
contract from A Plus Pawn Shop, a stand-alone pawnshop located 
in Houston, Texas.227  A Plus’ contract is a double sided, half-
page document.  The font of the text is small, around six point 
font, and the entire contract contains probably 1000 words.  The 
back page of the contract has two dense paragraphs of text.  The 
following is the entire second paragraph: 
If you pay the loan we will return the property to you in the same 
condition we received it.  If we lose your property or if it is damaged 
while in our possession, we will replace it with identical or similar 
property or similar property of the same kind and quality or have your 
property restored to its condition at the time it was deposited with us.  
All replacements are subject to approval by the Consumer Credit 
Commission.  Any person who possesses this payment ticket may pay 
us the amount due and we must give that person the pledged goods if 
we have not been notified in writing that this ticket has been stolen.  
IF THIS TICKET IS LOST OR STOLEN, YOU MUST NOTIFY US IN 
WRITING TO PROTECT YOUR PLEDGED GOODS.  Fee for lost 
ticket and statement. 
The contract’s front page has very little text, but instead is 
separated out into numerous boxes that state the amount 
financed, the finance charge, the APR, and a description of the 
pawned good, among other things. 
The final contracts I obtained were from Speedy Cash, a 
payday lending company that originated in California and has 
over ninety locations.228  Speedy Cash has different payday loan 
contracts for each state in which it operates to comply with state 
regulations.  The contract from Kansas is five pages long and has 
4415 words.229  The Truth in Lending Act disclosures are on the 
first page of the contract and in separate boxes, with the APR 
and finance charges highlighted.  The majority of the text is in 
ten point font, and most of it—2822 words—is an arbitration 
 
 226 Telephone Interview with Ron Demoss, General Counsel, Rent-A-Center, Nov. 13, 
2010. 
 227 A+ PAWN SHOP, http://apluspawnshop.com/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2011). 
 228 SPEEDY CASH, Store Locations, http://www.speedycash.com/payday-loan-store/ 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2011). 
 229 I also reviewed the contract from California, which is similar to the Kansas 
contract. 
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agreement.  One thousand three hundred twenty of the words of 
the contract are definitions and various terms.230  In addition to 
payday lending, Speedy Cash also does auto-title loans.  Its auto-
title loan documents are similar to its payday loan contracts but 
they have a single additional paragraph relating to the vehicle as 
collateral for the loan.231 
These contracts certainly appear different than the contract 
Warren refers to in her article in Democracy arguing for the need 
to regulate payday lending contracts.232  Without a survey of 
every payday lender’s contract in America, it is impossible to 
know the extent of the conduct Warren observed, or that I report 
here.  But, my analysis of these fringe banking contracts reveals 
that Warren’s observation is not ubiquitous in the payday 
lending industry or across fringe banking products, suggesting at 
least a need for more study to make the claim that payday 
lending contracts are misleading. 
More to the point, the contract Warren discusses is already 
an illegal contract under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA).  First, 
having an APR hidden in the contract violates the TILA 
provision requiring the APR to be more conspicuous than other 
disclosed terms.233  Additionally, an APR disclosure in a place 
other than the fee page does not follow the tabular format 
mandated by the TILA.234  Courts have already found at least one 
payday lender and one pawnshop to have violated this provision 
of TILA.  In Turner v. E-Z Check Cashing, the payday lender’s 
APR disclosure was even more conspicuous than the one Warren 
 
 230 The following paragraph is representative of the level of complexity: 
Telephone Calls—Monitoring:  You agree that if you are past due or in 
default, you will accept calls from us or a third party we have contracted with 
regarding the collection of your Account.  You understand these calls could be 
automatically dialed and a recorded message may be played.  You agree such 
calls will not be unsolicited calls for purposes of state and federal law.  If you 
provide us with a wireless or cellular telephone number, you agree that we 
may place calls to that number which may result in charges from your wireless 
or cellular carrier.  You also agree that, from time to time, we may monitor 
telephone conversations between you and us to assure the quality of our 
customer service. 
 231 Rent-A-Center also provided me with its payday loan contract from Kansas.  It is 
seven pages long and has similar font and contents to Speedy Cash.  Like Speedy Cash, it 
also has the Truth in Lending Act disclosures prominently on the first page of the 
agreement. 
 232 Warren, supra note 208, at 13 (“For example, buried in a page of disclosures for 
one lender (rather than on the fee page, where the customer might expect to see it) was 
the note that the interest rate on the offered loan was 485.450 percent.”). 
 233 15 U.S.C. § 1632(a) (2006) (“The terms ‘annual percentage rate’ and ‘finance 
charge’ shall be disclosed more conspicuously than other terms, data, or information 
provided in connection with a transaction, except information relating to the identity of 
the creditor.”). 
 234 15 U.S.C. § 1632(c). 
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reports because it was in a block of fee disclosures, but a court in 
Tennessee found it violated the TILA because “EZ’s disclosure 
document uses the same typesize, font, and boldness in listing 
the terms ‘annual percentage rate’ and ‘finance charge’ as it does 
in listing other terms, data, and information; thus these terms 
are no more conspicuous than others.”235  Similarly, in a case 
involving a contract very similar to the one Warren reports, the 
court held a pawn ticket violated the TILA because the term 
“APR” was “contained in the middle of a paragraph in the 
smallest print on the pawn ticket” and because “this section is 
similar in appearance to a section entitled ‘Customer 
Information’ and is less conspicuous than the section setting 
forth information on the vehicle used for collateral which is 
outlined in a box.”236 
Thus, we cannot justify the Bureau because of a need for 
additional rules for fringe banking contracts because the 
contracts to which Warren objects are already illegal.  It is 
possible the Bureau’s enforcement powers are needed to enforce 
the existing laws to a greater extent than other existing agencies 
have been able to do in hopes of eliminating illegal contracts from 
the market, but before reaching this conclusion, at least we need 
more evidence of how widespread confusing terms are used in 
fringe credit markets. 
ii.  Tricks and Traps in Product Design 
Another basis for the Bureau regulating fringe banking is 
that fringe banking transactions are designed in a way to deceive 
borrowers.  Bar-Gill and Warren make the argument that people 
taking out payday loans expect to pay them off in a short period 
of time, but they actually have to roll the loans over 
repeatedly.237  Borrowers are overly optimistic about the 
likelihood they will be able to pay off the loan, Bar-Gill and 
Warren contend, so they underestimate the cost of the loan and 
the risk of nonpayment.238 
This rationale for regulating payday lending reflects some 
evidence of how people use payday loans.  Studies report a 
significant number of people rollover their loans, ranging from 
the modal number of payday loans per year being one or two, an 
 
 235 Turner v. E-Z Check Cashing of Cookeville, TN, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1050 
(M.D. Tenn. 1999). 
 236 Yazzie v. Ray Vicker’s Special Cars, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1233 (D.N.M. 1998). 
 237 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 128, at 55–56. 
 238 Id.  See Karen E. Francis, Note, Rollover, Rollover: A Behavioral Law and 
Economics Analysis of the Payday-Loan Industry, 88 TEX. L. REV. 611, 612, 617–18 (2010). 
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estimate that is likely too low,239 to customers averaging 12.5 
loans a year.240  Similarly, a study from Tennessee found that 
“25% [of active title loans in the state] had been renewed one (1) 
time and 49% were renewed between two and nine times.  
Fourteen percent (14%) renewed 10 or more times.”241 
Critical to proving that people are tricked into rolling over 
their loans at a higher rate than they intended to at the start of 
the transaction, however, is proof that people did not anticipate 
rolling over their loans when they took them out.  A study from 
economists Marianne Bertrand and Adair Morse attempts to 
offer proof that people make mistakes when they take out payday 
loans, such as rolling over loans at a rate higher than they 
anticipate.242  Bertrand and Morse provided four different types 
of information to different payday lending customers as they 
were taking out their loans.243  The information caused borrowers 
to borrow with reduced frequency than the control group, 
suggesting that the control group would have acted differently 
with more or better information about the loan product.244 
The problem with this study, however, is that it does not 
offer any conclusions about why borrowers changed their 
behavior, so it fails to identify any specific cognitive defect that 
would cause people to rollover at a higher rate than 
anticipated.245  Also, Bertrand and Morse do not report whether 
people anticipated rolling over their loans at a rate lower than 
their actual rollover activity, so we still do not have a direct 
answer to the central empirical question: Do borrowers 
underestimate the likelihood they will rollover their payday loan?  
Finally, even if we did have evidence payday borrowers acted 
overly optimistically, this rationale is inapplicable to other forms 
of fringe credit, like rent-to-own leases, which do not have short-
term contracts, and refund anticipation loans, which only involve 
a single loan based on tax refunds without the possibility of 
rolling over the principle. 
 
 239 FDIC SURVEY, supra note 1, at 31. 
 240 Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Lending and the Military: 
The Law and Geography of “Payday” Loans in Military Towns, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 653, 663 
(2005). 
 241 TENN. DEP’T. OF FIN. INST., THE 2008 REPORT ON THE TITLE PLEDGE INDUSTRY 6 
(2008). 
 242 Marianne Bertrand & Adair Morse, Information Disclosure, Cognitive Biases and 
Payday Borrowing (Chicago Booth School of Bus., Working Paper No. 10-01, 2010), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1532213. 
 243 Id. at 11–13. 
 244 Id. at 33–35. 
 245 Id. at 9. 
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Despite these limitations, the case for intervening in payday 
lending markets because of mistakes people make about rollovers 
is slightly more persuasive than the case for deceptive contracts 
because at least some studies have documented high numbers of 
rollovers in payday lending markets.246  But, direct evidence of 
over optimism in payday lending markets simply does not exist 
at this point, so it is troubling to think that the Bureau would act 
on mere speculation about how borrowers use payday loans. 
B. Cost 
A second basis for the Bureau regulating fringe banking is 
the high cost involved in these transactions.  Twenty-eight 
percent of the articles and documents we reviewed (n=68) that 
offered justifications for the Bureau regulating fringe credit cited 
the cost of fringe credit.  Sources said things such as payday 
loans have “high,”247 “astronomical”248 and “outrageous” rates.249  
Refund anticipation loans were claimed to be “high-cost”250 and 
involve “super-high-interest,”251 and sources reported that rent-
to-own and payday loans rates are so high they are surprising252 
and that fringe services are usurious.253  Some sources made the 
point just by stating the interest rate: “Exhibit A: payday loans 
and their just-as-evil twin, car title loans . . . .  [A] typical 
borrower will pay $500 in interest on a $300 loan.”254 
 
 246 See Graves & Peterson, supra note 240, at 663. 
 247 Administration Takes Aim at Fine Print, LEWISTON MORNING TRIBUNE (IDAHO), 
July 1, 2009, at 3A (“The agency would be dedicated to protecting consumers when buying 
mortgages, using credit cards and taking out high-rate ‘payday loans.’”). 
 248 Hector Becerra, Payday Advance Lenders Targeted, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2008, at 
B1. 
 249 President Barack Obama, Weekly Address: Time for Action on Financial Reform 
for the Economy, Mar. 20, 2010, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ 
weekly-address-president-obama-urges-action-financial-reform. 
 250 Predatory Lending and Reverse Redlining: Are Low-Income, Minority and Senior 
Borrowers Targets for Higher-Cost Loans?: Hearing Before the Joint Econ. Comm., 111th 
Cong. 13 (2009) (statement of Sarah Bloom Raskin, Comm’r of Fin. Regulation, State of 
Md.). 
 251 Jon Green, Proposal Offers Vital Consumer Protection, HARTFORD COURANT 
(CONNECTICUT), Jan. 12, 2010, at A11. 
 252 Regulatory Restructuring: Enhancing Consumer Financial Products Regulation: 
Hearing Before the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 48–49 (2009) (statement of Luis V. 
Gutierrez, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., State of Ill.) (“So I just wanted to say to Professor 
Warren, Ms. Seidman, and others, I would like to put a floor on payday lending, a 
national one, so that at least we have some minimum standard.  I would like for the 
remitters to have somebody nationally, you know a federal regulator, I would like to see 
people maybe not buy an $800 TV and 3 years later pay $2,400 for it, or people to kind of, 
I don’t know, escape to installment loans at 500 and 600 percent.  Some people might be 
surprised that happens.  It happens.”). 
 253 Perspective and Proposals on the Community Reinvestment Act: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 10 
(2010) (statement of Cy Richardson, V.P. Hous. And Cmty. Dev.). 
 254 Elizabeth Palmberg, Ground Rules: Troubled Assets on Main Street, SOJOURNERS 
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Warren’s work exhibits a general concern that trusting 
lenders can cause consumers to pay a high price.255  She points to 
payday lending specifically as a product with abusive pricing, 
citing several examples of individuals who paid a lot to service 
payday loans, and concluding, “In total, the cost to American 
families of payday lending is estimated to be $4.2 billion a 
year”256 and “each year, predatory payday lending practices cost 
U.S. families $3.4 billion in excess fees and charges.”257  More 
significant than just pointing out the high cost of payday loans, 
however, is Warren’s forecast that the Bureau would allow people 
to get short-term, small-dollar loans for lower costs.258  With the 
Bureau in place, Warren predicted, “An older person who needed 
a little cash to make it until her Social Security check arrived 
would have a manageable loan, not one that would escalate into 
thousands of dollars in fees.”259 
The claim that fringe financial services are very expensive is 
undeniably true.  While there may be some debate about whether 
these high costs are justified,260 no one argues that fringe 
banking transactions involve low or even moderate cost products.  
Thus, if policymakers believe price alone is a reason to prevent 
credit transactions, this rationale represents a strong reason for 
the federal government to intervene in fringe credit markets.261 
Yet, despite the relevance of this justification for the 
Bureau’s activity, it is difficult to see what the Bureau can do to 
affect the cost of fringe credit.  The most significant barrier is the 
Act’s provision preventing the Bureau from setting a usury limit: 
“No provision of this title shall be construed as conferring 
authority on the Bureau to establish a usury limit applicable to 
an extension of credit offered or made by a covered person to a 
consumer, unless explicitly authorized by law.”262  Indeed, some 
 
MAGAZINE, Jul. 2009, at 12, 13. 
 255 Warren, supra note 208, at 9. 
 256 Id. at 13. 
 257 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 128, at 56–57; Warren, supra note 208. 
 258 Warren, supra note 208 at 19. 
 259 Id. at 19. 
 260 Compare Aaron Huckstep, Payday Lending: Do Outrageous Prices Necessarily 
Mean Outrageous Profits?, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 203, 230–31 (2007) (concluding 
payday lenders’ profits are not highly profitable), with Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Interest—
Good While Supplies Last: A Study of Payday Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 563, 571 (2010) (“While some scholars have questioned the profitability of the 
industry and the industry sometimes denies that its returns are excessive, the mere 
existence of such a large number of lenders belies the conclusion that these loans are not 
highly profitable.”). 
 261 I have argued elsewhere that high prices alone are a poor reason to regulate fringe 
credit. See Hawkins, supra note 50, at 2041. 
 262 Dodd-Frank § 1024(o). 
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reports suggest this provision was added under pressure from 
payday lenders.263 
While the Bureau may be able to limit some fees, such as 
late fees or fees for products bundled with loans like credit 
insurance, fringe bankers can easily reprice the loan with a 
higher interest rate to compensate for any lost revenue.264  There 
are many examples of businesses doing repricing, but one recent 
example from the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and 
Disclosure Act of 2009 is illustrative.265  This act limits upfront 
fees for secured credit cards, a form of fringe credit lending, but 
in response at least one card issuer has dramatically increased 
the interest rate on its secured card to offset losses from lower 
fees.266  Thus, without being able to limit both pricing 
mechanisms, the Bureau may have trouble affecting the cost of 
fringe credit. 
One way the Bureau may reduce the cost of credit to the poor 
is less direct.  The Bureau is required to study mechanisms for 
encouraging people in the fringe economy to use mainstream 
financial services.267  It is possible the Bureau will be able to 
move some borrowers from fringe credit sources into mainstream 
credit sources that have lower costs.  The FDIC has done a pilot 
program to encourage banks to supplant payday lenders,268 and 
the results are mixed, with payday lenders seeing the experiment 
 
 263 Timothy Noah, Legal Usury, SLATE (Oct. 5, 2010, 6:53 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2270044/ (“Indeed, one of the sketchier provisions in Dodd-Frank 
affirmatively prohibits Warren’s new agency from setting a maximum interest rate on 
payday loans.  This was inserted at the behest of Senator Bob Corker, R.-Tenn.  (The 
payday-loan business was reportedly born in Corker’s home state and continues to thrive 
there.)”).  Skeel, on the other hand, implies that credit card issuers were behind the ban 
on usury limits. SKEEL, supra note 98, at 109. 
 264 See generally Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79 
(2000) (discussing the market operations of credit card companies in the context of 
bankruptcy law). 
 265 15 U.S.C. 1637 (2006). 
 266 Adam Levitin, New Credit Card Tricks, Traps, and 79.9% APRs, CREDIT SLIPS 
(Dec. 18, 2009, 3:48 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2009/12/new-credit-card-
tricks-traps-and-799-aprs.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2011) (“Currently, a First Premier 
card bears a 9.9% purchase APR, a $250 line of credit and at least $256 in fees in the first 
year, $179 of which are immediately applied.  The $256 is divided among four different 
fees.  First Premier is apparently now using direct mailing offers to test a new product 
that conforms with the Credit CARD Act.  This new card has $75 in fees and a $300 credit 
line, but a 79.9% purchase APR.”). 
 267 Dodd-Frank § 1013(d)(2)(C).  See also Dodd-Frank § 1073(c) (mandating that other 
agencies regulating commercial banks and credit unions find ways to encourage people to 
move from the fringe economy to mainstream institutions). 
 268 See Small-Dollar Loan Pilot Program, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/smalldollarloans/ 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2011) (noting the program was “designed to illustrate how banks can 
profitably offer affordable small-dollar loans as an alternative to high-cost credit products, 
such as payday loans”). 
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as a flop269 and consumer advocates judging the experiment to be 
a success.270  To the extent that the Bureau can lower the cost of 
credit by matching borrowers with less expensive alternatives, it 
will add significant value to the welfare of borrowers, but it will 
be a long time before we know if this feat is possible. 
C. Financial Distress 
The potential end result of high costs and deception—
financial distress—is the third justification offered for the 
Bureau governing fringe credit.  Fifteen percent of sources we 
found arguing for the Bureau to regulate fringe credit (n=35) 
asserted that fringe banking causes financial distress.271  Sources 
described the effect fringe credit has on the entire economy, on 
individual borrowers who declare bankruptcy because of fringe 
credit, and on borrowers who are trapped in debt because of 
fringe credit.  For instance, sources mentioned that payday 
lending, along with mortgages, “not only cause harm to 
individual consumers [but] can have a cumulative effect on our 
economy that is nothing short of devastating.”272  Testimony to 
Congress stated that “[o]ne in two consumers who get payday 
loans default within the first year, and consumers who receive 
these loans are twice as likely to enter bankruptcy within two 
years as those who seek and are denied them.”273  Finally, 
numerous sources described payday loans as a debt trap.274 
Warren also states plainly that payday lending causes people 
to experience financial ruin, noting examples of people hounded 
by payday lenders until they declare bankruptcy,275 and 
 
 269 See FDIC Small Loan Program Doesn’t Live up to the Hype, PAYDAY PUNDIT (Aug. 
12, 2008), http://paydaypundit.org/2008/08/12/fdic-small-loan-program-doesnt-live-up-to-
the-hype/ (arguing the program has been unsuccessful and the FDIC is “still trying to 
figure out how to make it work”). 
 270 See FDIC’s Small-Dollar Loan Pilot Shows Banks Can Offer Alternatives to High-
Cost, Short-Term Credit for Small-Dollar Loans, LOANSAFE.ORG (June 24, 2010), 
http://www.loansafe.org/fdics-small-dollar-loan-pilot-shows-banks-can-offer-alternatives-
to-high-cost-short-term-credit-for-small-dollar-loans (claiming the FDIC’s program has 
been highly beneficial for both banks and consumers). 
 271 We coded a source as claiming that the Bureau is justified in regulating fringe 
banking if it said fringe banking causes people to declare bankruptcy, causes people to 
suffer under unmanageable debt loads, causes people to lack the ability to make ends 
meet, or caused the current economic crisis. 
 272 Green, supra note 251. 
 273 Consumer Federation of America Legislative Director Travis B. Plunkett Prepared 
Testimony Before the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on Creating a 
Consumer Financial Protection Agency: A Cornerstone of America’s New Economic 
Foundation, as Released by the Committee, July 15, 2009. 
 274 National Consumer Law Center Managing Attorney Lauren Saunders Testifies 
Before the House Financial Services Subcommittee—Final, FD (Fair Disclosure) Wire, 
July 16, 2009; Local Voices, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 2, 2009. 
 275 Warren, supra note 208, at 13. 
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explaining that payday loans with individuals can impose costs 
on third parties: 
Credit cards, subprime mortgages, and payday loans can lead to 
financial distress, bankruptcy, and foreclosure.  Economic losses can 
be imposed on innocent third parties, including neighbors of foreclosed 
property, and widespread economic instability may affect economic 
growth and job prospects for millions of families that never took on a 
risky financial instrument.276 
Bankruptcy is an unlikely result for a consumer who simply 
pays a small fee, Bar-Gill and Warren note, but “[t]he problem 
lies with the substantial subset of consumers who take out 
multiple advances and pay the $30 fee many times over.”277  
Things will be different under the Bureau, Warren asserts, 
because “[r]ollovers that can turn a simple loan into a mountain 
of debt would stop.”278 
I have argued at length in another article that this rationale 
for regulating fringe banking is flawed.279  Two major features of 
fringe transactions make it highly unlikely that they cause 
borrowers to become overindebted and experience financial 
distress.  First, most forms of fringe credit are self-liquidating—if 
the borrower does not make payments on the loan, the lender 
sells the collateral and does not seek a deficiency from the 
borrower, so it is literally impossible to become overindebted 
because the borrower is not personally liable for the debt.280  
Second, all forms of fringe credit involve people borrowing small 
amounts of principle.  Unlike credit cards and mortgages, which 
can lead to significant amounts of debt, fringe credit transactions 
all involve very limited debt loads, so the effect of the 
transactions on the people using them and the economy as a 
whole is small, especially relative to other credit products.281  
Because of the dubious link between fringe banking and financial 
distress, the Bureau is on shaky ground regulating fringe credit 
on this basis. 
D. Unregulated Markets 
A fourth justification offered for the Bureau regulating fringe 
credit markets is the claim that these markets are currently 
 
 276 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 128, at 3. 
 277 Id. at 44. 
 278 Warren, supra note 208, at 19. 
 279 See generally Jim Hawkins, Regulating on the Fringe: Reexamining the Link 
Between Fringe Banking and Financial Distress, 86 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2011), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1649094_code600329.pdf? 
abstractid=1554768&mirid=5. 
 280 Id. (manuscript at 33–35). 
 281 Id. 
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unregulated.  In the results from our study of rationales for the 
Bureau governing fringe banking, we repeatedly found claims 
that fringe banking is currently unregulated.  Forty-nine percent 
(n=118) of the results presenting arguments for the Bureau 
claimed that fringe banking transactions currently operate under 
little regulation.282  Some sources contended that fringe lenders 
have escaped regulation entirely283 or that they operate in the 
Wild West of financial services with little oversight.284  Other 
sources noted the inconsistency in state regulations that left 
some consumers completely unprotected,285 and others asserted 
that no federal regulator governed fringe credit before the 
Bureau.286 
Warren’s foundational articles take a much more 
sophisticated position, although at times in making her 
argument, she seems to suggest that credit markets “follow a 
caveat emptor model.”287  She points out that there are some state 
and federal regulations, but she posits that these regulations of 
credit products are insufficient because they are not structured to 
adapt to frequently changing credit markets288 and they are too 
diffuse—merely “a loose amalgam of common law, statutory 
prohibitions, and regulatory-agency oversight . . . structurally 
incapable of providing effective protection.”289  These sorts of 
 
 282 We coded sources as justifying the Bureau because fringe banking products are 
unregulated if the source said fringe transactions are unregulated either by state or the 
federal governments.  We did not code the source as saying fringe credit is unregulated 
merely because the source stated something like “we need a new regulator or cop devoted 
to consumers.”  The source had to say affirmatively that fringe banking products have few 
regulations now. 
 283 Ronald D. Orol, Why Washington Can't Agree on Consumer Protection, 
MARKETWATCH (Mar. 4, 2010, 12:56 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/why-
washington-cant-agree-on-consumer-protection-2010-03-04 (“They want the agency to 
cover a hodge-podge of financial companies that, so far, have escaped regulation of any 
sort.  These include pay-day lenders, who offer high-risk, short-term cash loans to low-
income individuals, the predatory rent-to-own industry, the mortgage modification 
consultants, and smaller state and local mortgage brokers, who originated many of the 
worst mortgages.”). 
 284 The Rachel Maddow Show (MSNBC television broadcast Mar. 9, 2010) (Heather 
McGhee, Director, Washington Office of Demos, stated: “But at the consumer level, there’s 
just a new Wild West situation out there where the banks, the payday lenders, the rent-
to-own stores, the used auto dealers have just basically had very little oversight and 
they’ve profited from that regime”). 
 285 Regulatory Restructuring: Enhancing Consumer Financial Products Regulation: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 16 (2009) (statement of Ellen 
Seidman, Senior Fellow, New Am. Found.). 
 286 John Ydstie, Overhaul Rules Stuck On Financial Protection Agency, NATIONAL 
PUBLIC RADIO (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
story.php?storyId=124559223. 
 287 Warren, supra note 208, at 14. 
 288 Id. at 9. 
 289 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 128, at 6.  Another argument Warren makes to 
support the claim that credit markets are insufficiently regulated is that states lack the 
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arguments have been made by others as well, who point out that 
current federal regulation of credit markets fall to seven different 
regulators, none of whom have consumers as their central 
focus.290  Having divided missions resulted in agencies, like the 
Federal Reserve, neglecting consumer protection: “It never made 
sense to simply include consumer protection among the Fed’s 
other tasks, for instance, since the Fed’s primary concern is 
maintaining the stability of the banking system, which stands in 
considerable tension with consumer protection.”291 
The common claim that fringe banking operates in a 
regulatory vacuum is easy to dismiss as a faulty reason for the 
Bureau regulating fringe credit.  In every state and under federal 
law, lending activity is subject to some general regulations, such 
as the Truth in Lending Act292 or the state equivalent.293  
Moreover, for many fringe credit transactions, state statutes 
aimed specifically at that type of transaction govern fringe 
credit.294 
Warren’s claim that state and federal regulations are not 
effective at countering innovative creditor malfeasance is much 
more applicable to fringe banking markets.  Many commentators 
have noted how adept fringe creditors are at avoiding restrictive 
regulations.295  The recent change in the payday lending law in 
Arizona provides an example.  In Arizona, a specific statute 
enabled payday lenders to operate above the thirty-six percent 
usury cap in the state for ten years, but in 2010, that statute 
 
power to set rate caps on credit products. See Warren, supra note 208, at 13–14. (“While 
states still play some role, particularly in the regulation of real-estate transactions, their 
primary tool—interest rate regulation—has been effectively destroyed by federal 
legislation.  Today, any lender that gets a federal bank charter can locate its operations in 
a state with high usury rates (e.g., South Dakota or Delaware), then export that states’ 
interest rate caps (or no caps at all) to customers located all over the country.  As a result, 
and with no public debate, interest rates have been effectively deregulated across the 
country, leaving the states powerless to act.”).  This rationale is plainly inapplicable to 
fringe banking products.  Numerous states have capped rates for payday loans, pawn 
loans, auto-title loans, and rent-to-own transactions. See Leah A. Plunkett et al., Small 
Dollar Loan Products Scorecard—Updated, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. (May 2010), 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/high_cost_small_loans/payday_loans/cu-small-dollar-
scorecard-2010.pdf. 
 290 Levitin, supra note 138, at 3. 
 291 Skeel, supra note 98, at 15. 
 292 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (2006). 
 293 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140D (2010). 
 294 Proof of this claim would result in an article-long footnote, but for a few examples, 
see LA. R.S. 37:1801(D) (2010) (“Under no circumstances shall the practice commonly 
referred to as motor vehicle ‘title only’ pawn transactions be allowed in this state.”);; 
Martin, supra note 260, at 564 (noting payday lending is legal in only thirty-five states); 
ALA. CODE § 5-19A-3 (West 2010) (requiring pawn tickets to contain extensive amounts of 
information); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1351.05(A) (West 2010) (requiring rent-to-own 
dealers to reinstate rental agreements even after default). 
 295 Johnson, supra note 31, at 18–21. 
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sunset, effectively making payday lending illegal.296  In response 
to the rate cap, some payday lenders are operating as they did 
before the sunset, but are now essentially offering payday loans 
disguised as auto-title loans, which remain legal in the state.297  
Before the law even sunset, 200 payday lenders filed for licenses 
to operate as title lenders, and the Attorney General of Arizona 
believed that “a lot of people are [getting] ready by telling their 
customers to shift to auto-title loans, even if they don’t have a 
car.”298  Lenders can offer payday-like loans to customers with 
cars by extending the loan based on the person’s paycheck and 
taking a second-lien position on the car without ever intending to 
use the vehicle as collateral.299  If Arizona really intended to ban 
payday lending, it appears to have failed.  To truly eliminate 
payday lending, the legislature will have to pass another law 
altering the title loan statute to prevent the conduct described 
here. 
The Bureau, however, will be able to learn about and act on 
subterfuge more quickly than a legislative body.  Instead of going 
through the complex steps to pass a law and have it approved by 
the executive branch, the Bureau will be able to make rules to 
clarify the consumer protection laws and rules it enforces.  If the 
Arizona situation had happened under the Bureau’s watch, the 
Bureau could have drafted a rule that prevents lenders from 
taking a second lien position on the title loan or making a title 
loan to someone without a vehicle.  Although the rulemaking 
process may take some time, the Bureau would be much more 
nimble and able to respond to problematic practices.  Given the 
penchant some fringe creditors have shown for evading 
 
 296 Allison S. Woolston, Law & Policy Note, Neither Borrower Nor Lender Be: The 
Future of Payday Lending in Arizona, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 853, 854–55 (2010). 
 297 A similar thing happened in Virginia when it banned payday lending. See Korey 
Clark, States Put Brakes on Auto Title Lending, STATE NET CAPITOL J., July 26, 2010, at 6 
(“In fact, industry lobbyists and consumer groups in Arizona expect payday lenders to 
switch to car title lending as a result of the ban imposed on payday lending this past 
spring, because that’s exactly what has happened in Virginia since it restricted payday 
lending.  ‘They moved to the car title model because they realized there were hardly any 
requirements,’ said Dana Wiggins of the Virginia Poverty Law Center, an advocacy group 
for low-income people that pushed for the payday lending restrictions.  ‘It was kind of like 
a newfound treasure trove.  You saw all of these folks who used to have payday loans 
were being moved into car title loans by payday lenders.’”). 
 298 Michelle Price, Payday Lending Expires in Arizona, Officials Keeping an Eye on 
Loan Practices, THE GAEA TIMES (June 29, 2010), http://business.gaeatimes.com/2010/06/ 
29/payday-lending-expires-in-arizona-officials-keeping-an-eye-on-loan-practices-74739/. 
 299 Dale Quinn, Industry Shifting to New Services as Payday Lending Becomes Illegal, 
ARIZ. DAILY STAR, June 27, 2010, at A1 (“Auto-title loans should be given only to the 
owner of the vehicle being used as collateral.  If a lender says ownership of the vehicle 
and its value are not important, the borrower should proceed with caution and consider 
contacting the Attorney General's Office, said Goddard, who is running for governor.”). 
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regulation, the Bureau has an important opportunity to ensure 
lenders actually comply with federal regulations. 
E. Predatory and Abusive Lending 
Finally, our study recorded instances where results 
described fringe banking products as abusive, unfair, or 
predatory without any further explanation.  Most sources, fifty-
five percent (n=133), discussing justifications for the Bureau 
regulating fringe credit appealed to this rationale.  The results 
decried fringe creditors as unscrupulous,300 rapacious,301 
notorious,302 unconscionable,303 like crack,304 and the worst 
actors,305 along with simply abusive306 and predatory307.  Warren 
almost completely avoids merely characterizing fringe banking as 
predatory without additional details.308 
It appears that these statements, although common, do not 
assert separate bases for regulating fringe credit from those 
already discussed but instead operate as either simply vacuous 
attacks or summaries of other reasons for regulating fringe 
credit.  Unless the Bureau acts with the least amount of 
 
 300 Proposed Consumer Financial Protection Agency: Implications for Consumers and 
the FTC, Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Commerce, Trade, & Consumer Protection of 
the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Michael Barr, 
Asst. Sec’y for Fin. Inst.) (“A wide range of credit products are offered—from payday loans 
to pawn shops, to auto loans and car title loans, many from large national chains—with 
little supervision or enforcement.  Closely regulated credit unions and community banks 
with straightforward credit products struggle to compete with less scrupulous providers 
who appear to offer a good deal and then pull a switch on the consumer.”). 
 301 Congresswoman Carolyn B. Maloney Holds a Hearing on the Economic Outlook, 
CQ Transcriptions, LLC, Apr. 14, 2010 (“Payday lenders, rent to own, debt collectors, 
these are some of the most rapacious people.  They prey on the poor.”). 
 302 Bill Swindell, Payday Lenders Hope to Win Changes By Blaming Banks, 
CONGRESSDAILY (May 4, 2010), http://www.nationaljournal.com/member/daily/payday-
lenders-hope-to-win-changes-by-blaming-banks-20100504 (subscription required). 
 303 David Lazarus, Payday Lenders Pressure Borrowers to Get Political, L.A. TIMES, 
May 7, 2010, at B1. 
 304 David Lazarus, Payday Lenders Sink Loan Limits, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 2010, at 
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 305 Sen. Richard J. Durbin (D-IL), Durbin Statement on the Passage of Sweeping Wall 
Street Reform Bill (July 15, 2010), http://durbin.senate.gov/showRelease.cfm?releaseId= 
326420; Victoria McGrane, Dodd Moving Ahead with Reform, POLITICO.COM (Jan. 15, 
2010), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0110/31548.html. 
 306 Mike Lillis, Dodd (Alone) to Unveil Financial Reform Bill Monday, WASHINGTON 
INDEPENDENT, Mar. 11, 2010, https://washingtonindependent.com/78978/dodd-to-unveil-
financial-reform-bill-monday. 
 307 Mind the Gap: Discriminatory Practices, Public Policies Foster Accelerating Wealth 
Disparity, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Jun. 3, 2010, at B8. 
 308 The only instance I found was Warren’s claim that the change in law protecting 
military personnel from payday lending “will protect military families from payday 
lenders, but it will leave all other families subject to the same predatory practices.” 
Warren, supra note 208, at 14.  This assertion, however, is probably just a summary of 
the other arguments she had already made against payday loans and not a stand-alone 
point. 
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reflection, it is unlikely these blanket assertions will have any 
influence on its behavior.  Because this category is merely a 
rehash of earlier rationales, I do not discuss it in further detail 
here. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that the Dodd-Frank Act gives the 
Bureau the power to intervene in a substantial way in fringe 
credit markets for the first time.  The Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau will amass a lot of information about how 
fringe creditors operate and about market failures in these 
industries.  Moreover, it will have unprecedented power and 
resources to enforce and promulgate rules restricting fringe 
banking activities. 
The justifications for the Bureau intervening in fringe credit 
markets are a very mixed lot—some plainly misunderstanding 
the nature of the markets, and others offering a real opportunity 
for the Bureau to improve the experience consumers have with 
these financial services.  My fear is that the Bureau will regulate 
in view of the former instead of the latter.  If the Bureau works to 
restrict fringe credit on the erroneous assumption that fringe 
credit contracts are deceptive or lead borrowers to financial 
distress, consumers may lose access to financial services that 
they desperately need and already understand.  Or, in a less 
extreme scenario, the Bureau could focus its attention on 
reforming the form of the contracts and miss the opportunity to 
actively detect and police creditors evading existing laws. 
The final part of this Article hopes to urge the Bureau to 
carefully consider its rationales for regulating fringe credit before 
undertaking studies, promulgating rules, or engaging in 
enforcement actions.  By ensuring that it acts in response to 
problems that have been demonstrated with evidence, the 
Bureau can work to improve credit for those who have been 
excluded from mainstream financial services without 
jeopardizing the welfare-enhancing function fringe creditors can 
have. 
 
 
 
 
 
